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Some Realism about Punishment Naturalism 
Donald Braman,† Dan M. Kahan,†† & David Hoffman‡ 
In this Article, we critique the increasingly prominent claims of Punishment Natu-
ralism—the notion that highly nuanced intuitions about most forms of crime and pu-
nishment are broadly shared, and that this agreement is best explained by a particular 
form of evolutionary psychology. While the core claims of Punishment Naturalism are 
deeply attractive and intuitive, they are contradicted by a broad array of studies and 
depend on a number of logical missteps. The most obvious shortcoming of Punishment 
Naturalism is that it ignores empirical research demonstrating deep disagreements over 
what constitutes a wrongful act and just how wrongful a given act should be deemed to 
be. But an equally serious shortcoming of Punishment Naturalism is that it fails to pro-
vide a credible account of the social and cognitive mechanisms by which individuals 
evaluate both crime and punishment, opting instead for explanations that are either 
specific and demonstrably wrong or so vague as to be untestable. 
By way of contrast, we describe an alternative approach, Punishment Realism, that 
develops the core insights of legal realism via psychology and anthropology. Punishment 
Realism, we argue, offers a more complete account of agreement and disagreement over 
the criminal law and provides a more detailed and credible account of the social and cog-
nitive mechanisms that move people to either agree or disagree with one another on 
whether a given act should be praised or punished and how much praise or punishment it 
deserves. The differences between these two empirical accounts also suggest contrasting 
implications for how those interested in maximizing social welfare and public satisfaction 
with the law should approach questions of crime and punishment.  
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The sure fatality is to imagine variance not there or wait for it to go 
away.  
–Clifford Geertz
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
You are at the bus station, bringing the rings to your best friend’s 
wedding, when your wallet and ticket are stolen. No one will lend you 
money to pay the fare. You notice a well-heeled fellow traveler heading 
to the restroom, leaving jacket and ticket behind. You think about it. He 
could afford another ticket. There’s no chance you’d be caught. But in 
the end you can’t bring yourself to do it. As painful as it will be to miss 
the wedding, you just know that stealing the ticket would be wrong.  
But how do you know that? How do any of us know right from 
wrong? Is our morality by and large determinate and innate, the prod-
uct of evolutionary forces acting over millions of years, or do we acquire 
it within our lifetimes, reading acts in relation to variable social norms 
that we have assimilated from those around us? How we answer these 
questions matters. If humans share highly specific intuitions about jus-
tice as a consequence of innate moral mechanisms, then it will be quite 
difficult, perhaps even impossible, to alter those intuitions, and we 
should be very cautious if we plan to adopt an approach to punishment 
that deviates from these innate preferences. If, on the other hand, we 
develop a sense of morality over our lifetimes in relation to varied so-
cial norms, then we might learn how our moral intuitions are shaped 
and develop means of fostering conceptions of justice that are both sa-
tisfying to us and compatible with our collective welfare.  
This Article argues that although moral judgments depend on 
numerous cognitive and physiological mechanisms that are presuma-
bly the product of evolutionary pressures, they are not innate insofar 
as they depend crucially on social meaning that varies across cultural 
groups. In our opening hypothetical, you (or, rather, our hypothetical 
version of you) refused to steal the ticket. But not everyone would, as 
evidenced not only by the hypothetical (though perhaps familiar) 
theft of your wallet, but also by extensive empirical research that we 
describe below.  
In developing this account, this Article critiques the increasingly 
prominent claims of Punishment Naturalism—the notion that highly 
nuanced intuitions about most forms of crime and punishment are 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology 219 
(Basic Books 1983). 
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broadly shared because they are innate.
2
 To their credit, Punishment 
Naturalists marshal an impressive array of empirical research into 
widely shared human intuitions. Many humans do share broad intui-
tions that provide them with nearly effortless appraisals of wrong-
doing. But if the core claims of Punishment Naturalism are deeply 
attractive and intuitive, they are not unassailable. There are extensive 
data showing dissensus over punishment for which naturalism cannot 
account. There is also a troubling void in naturalism where one would 
expect a credible account of either the social or cognitive mechanisms 
by which individuals evaluate crime and punishment.  
A fuller and more accurate explanation of human intuitions 
about wrongdoing is offered by what we call Punishment Realism.
3
 
Uniting the insights of legal realists with research conducted by anth-
ropologists, social psychologists, and evolutionary biologists, Punish-
ment Realism is based on the premise that while individuals do hold 
deep and abiding intuitions regarding wrongdoing and responses to it, 
these intuitions depend on social constructs that are demonstrably 
plastic. Thus, while there are a number of important (perhaps even 
universal) features of human cognition that shape our understandings 
of wrongdoing, they are features that interact with, and enable the 
construction of, varied social norms rather than produce them in a 
determinate manner.  
How varied are our norms? If you thought you should refrain 
from taking the ticket because it was wrong, then you agree with most 
Americans. On a naturalist account, this makes sense: the “taking of 
property without consent” is a moral violation, part of the “core of 
wrongdoing”
4
—something on which nearly all humans normally agree. 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Although this Article is limited to the specific application of naturalism to punishment 
theory, Punishment Naturalism partakes of a broader trend toward legal analyses drawing on 
research in the area of evolutionary psychology, much of which avoids the pitfalls we describe 
herein. See, for example, Owen D. Jones and Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A 
New Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 Wm & Mary L Rev 1935, 1953–54 (2008); Rose 
McDermott, James H. Fowler, and Oleg Smirnov, On the Evolutionary Origin of Prospect Theory 
Preferences, 70 J Polit 335, 337–38 (2008); Herbert Gintis, The Evolution of Private Property, 64 J 
Econ Behav & Org 1, 2–3 (2007); Jeffrey E. Stake, The Property “Instinct,” 359 Phil Transactions 
Royal Socy B: Bio Sci 1763, 1767 (2004); Paul H. Rubin, Darwinian Politics: The Evolutionary 
Origin of Freedom 173 (Rutgers 2002). The naturalism that we describe here is distinct from, and 
should not be confused with, the philosophical use of the term. See, for example, Keith Campbell, 
Naturalism, in Donald M. Borchert, ed, 6 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 492, 492 (Thomson 2d ed 
2006) (defining naturalism in the philosophical context as representing the proposition that “the 
natural world is the only real one, and that the human race is not separate from it, but belongs to 
it as a part”). 
 3 See generally Donald Braman and Dan M. Kahan, Legal Realism as Psychological and 
Cultural (Not Political) Realism, in Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha Merrill Umph-
rey, eds, How Law Knows 93, 112–13 (Stanford 2007). 
 4 For further discussion of these terms, see note 35 and accompanying text. 
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And no one can blame you for missing the wedding—after all, you 
have a reasonable excuse for missing it. But researchers who posed 
the same question in India found that the vast majority of participants 
there thought that you would be justified in taking the ticket.
5
 Where 
American subjects tended to justify missing the wedding in moral 
terms that centered on individualized justice and personal property, 
Indian participants tended to justify the theft in moral terms that em-
phasized the social and relational responsibilities of friends, particular-
ly at such an important event. When researchers asked tribal leaders 
in Papua New Guinea how they would resolve a similar scenario, the 
leaders not only thought that stealing would be justified, but blamed 
the people who failed to be of assistance: “If nobody helped him and 
he did that I wouldn’t charge him for that because I would say we had 
caused that problem.”
6
 These broad cultural differences reflect varia-
tions in underlying norms regarding property, mutual responsibility, 
and accountability—norms that fundamentally shape the way we eva-
luate the wrongfulness of specific acts.  
Before we turn to the details of this critique, we feel it is vital to 
disclose our motivations for undertaking it. We apprehend the world 
of criminal law from the intertwined vantage points of scholars, teach-
ers, and interested citizens. What we see fills us simultaneously with 
wonder and fear, hope and anxiety.  
To us, the most conspicuous feature of the criminal law landscape 
is political conflict. We observe persistent and intense disagreement on 
a wide variety of issues, many going to the core of the State’s twin ob-
ligations to protect its citizens from harm and to respect their free-
dom. When a man kills an attacker in a public space despite the op-
portunity to flee, is that murder or a justified exercise of self-defense?
7
 
How about when a woman kills a sleeping husband who for years has 
subjected her to physical torment and emotional degradation?
8
 If a 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Joan G. Miller and David M. Bersoff, Culture and Moral Judgment, 62 J Personality 
& Soc Psych 541, 547 (1992) (reporting that 45 percent of American adults and 85 percent of 
Indian adults thought taking the ticket was appropriate, and that 43 percent of American third 
graders and 98 percent of Indian third graders thought that taking the ticket was appropriate). 
 6 Anne M. Tietjen and Lawrence J. Walker, Moral Reasoning and Leadership among Men 
in a Papua New Guinea Society, 21 Develop Psych 982, 989 (1985) (characterizing the tribe’s 
conception of morality as emphasizing “community harmony”). 
 7 See Patrik Jonsson, Is Self-Defense Law Vigilante Justice?, Christian Sci Monitor (Feb 24, 
2006), online at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0224/p02s01-usju.html (visited May 1, 2010) 
(reporting on the national controversy over a newly enacted spate of “stand your ground” laws 
that permit the use of deadly force despite the possibility of retreat). See also Dan M. Kahan and 
Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 Colum L Rev 269, 329–
32 (1996) (describing the historical underpinnings of the dispute in competing cultural styles). 
 8 See Kahan and Nussbaum, 96 Colum L Rev at 332–33 (cited in note 7) (comparing how 
jurisdictions treat this issue to how they treat duty to flee under self-defense doctrine). 
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man has sex with a woman who repeatedly says “no,” should he be 
deemed a rapist—or even punished at all?
9
 Should a man who “loses 
control” and kills his wife for having sex with another man be treated 
as less culpable than a premeditated murderer?
10
 How about a man 
who kills another man for soliciting sex from him?
11
 Should people be 
sent to jail for using recreational drugs?
12
 Is a corporation’s decision to 
promote its stock with boastful speech about its balance sheet a form 
of criminal fraud, or merely puffery that is protected by both the 
common law and the First Amendment? To us, disputes over issues 
like these attest to the remarkable heterogeneity of cultural values 
within our society.  
The diversity of positions political communities have adopted on 
such issues—over place and over time—makes us conscious of the 
plasticity of social norms and of the resulting urgency of using law to 
promote morally defensible norms. At the same time, our recognition 
of the unavoidable connection between the law’s position in such con-
flicts and the status of contested visions of the good life makes us an-
xious when assessing the proper scope for norm shaping in a liberal 
society and intent on discovering means for avoiding cultural domina-
tion and accommodating difference.  
This is decidedly not the picture of the criminal-law world painted 
by Punishment Naturalists. They perceive not conflict but consensus, 
not cultural heterogeneity but biological uniformity. As they read the 
evidence (generated by their studies and those of others), “human 
intuitions of justice about core wrongdoing . . . are deep, predictable, 
and widely shared,”
13
 the product of “evolved predisposition” and of 
“social learning arising only from an aspect of human life experience 
. . . so fundamental as to be essentially universal to all persons without 
regard to circumstances or culture.”
14
  
                                                                                                                           
 9 See generally Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Harvard 1987) (discussing the controversy over 
this issue). 
 10 See Kahan and Nussbaum, 96 Colum L Rev at 346–47 (cited in note 7) (noting contested 
and changing attitudes on this issue). 
 11 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv L Rev 413, 465–67 
(1999) (describing the political conflict over whether such offenses should be graded as the 
aggravated “hate crime” form of murder or instead mitigated to voluntary manslaughter). 
 12 See John Hoeffel, Bid to Legalize Pot Advances: Initiative Backers Gather What Is Likely 
to Be Enough Signatures to Put Their Measure on the California Ballot in November, LA Times 
A14 (Jan 29, 2010). Consider also Gary Fields, Shorter Sentences Sought for Crack: Administra-
tion Tells Congress It Favors Ending Disparity with Powder Cocaine, Wall St J A3 (Apr 30, 2009) 
(detailing proposals by the Obama administration to eliminate the sentencing disparity between 
crack and powder cocaine offenses).  
 13 Paul H. Robinson and Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Jus-
tice, 91 Minn L Rev 1829, 1892 (2007). 
 14 Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban, and Owen D. Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions 
of Justice, 60 Vand L Rev 1633, 1646, 1687 (2007). 
File: 01 Braman, Kahan, and Hoffman Created on:  10/13/2010 11:42:00 AM Last Printed: 10/27/2010 4:42:00 PM 
1536 The University of Chicago Law Review [77:1531 
Where we see mutability in norms, and hence the inescapability of 
collective responsibility for their content, the naturalists apprehend 
their stability and warn of the futility and even perversity of using crim-
inal law as an instrument of norm reform. “[T]he universal and intuitive 
nature of core judgments about justice” cautions against being “optimis-
tic that arguments or education necessarily will produce . . . change[s] in 
judgments about justice.”
15
 And “trying to alter people’s intuitions of 
justice” through law reform—or as the naturalists put it, “criminal law 
manipulation” by “social engineers” aimed at “get[ting] people to view 
conduct . . . as condemnable or more condemnable”
16
—must be viewed 
with deep suspicion: “[A] criminal justice system that regularly fails to 
do justice or that regularly does injustice, as judged by shared intuitions 
of justice . . . will inevitably be seen as failing in a mission” that the 
community thinks important,
17
 thereby vitiating its “moral credibility” 
and fomenting “generalized contempt for the system in all its aspects, 
and a generalized suspicion of all of its rules.”
18
 The dilemma of how to 
manage the norm-shaping potential of law in a liberal society is thus 
dispelled by the proclaimed nonexistence of meaningful cultural con-
flict combined with the prudential necessity of respecting genetically 
programmed moral instincts.  
But the tangled complex of hopes and fears we experience when 
we survey criminal law is not vanquished by Punishment Naturalism. 
We think it is important to advise others who share our sensibilities that 
there is nothing in Punishment Naturalism to make them feel better (or 
worse). As far as we can tell, there is not a single position of any conse-
quence on any of the contested issues we have already adverted (or on 
many like ones) that is ruled out or in by Punishment Naturalism. 
The Punishment Naturalists might well demur; their target, they 
might claim, consists of marginal “academics or policy wonks”
19
 who 
believe that law should be structured on the basis of a utilitarian cal-
culus that excludes public sensibilities altogether, or that the institu-
tion of criminal law or the practice of “punishment” should simply be 
abolished.20 (Ironically, the most serious purveyors of these positions are 
a pair of Antipunishment Naturalists who draw exactly the opposite 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal 
Law and Justice Policy, 81 S Cal L Rev 1, 51–52 (2007). 
 16 Id at 52. 
 17 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1688 (cited in note 14). 
 18 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 24 (cited in note 15). See also id at 23. 
 19 Id at 54. 
 20 See Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1688 (cited in note 14). 
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conclusion from the materials upon which the Punishment Naturalists 
themselves rely.
21
) 
But their sweeping language, as well as some of their own exam-
ples of suspect “[norm-]reform programs”—ones aimed at “eradi-
cat[ing] the notion that women often pretend to withhold consent to 
intercourse to appear more alluring,” at “rais[ing] the general level of 
societal condemnation of the [domestic] abuser,” and at “build[ing] 
public acceptance of both same-sex intercourse and the legal recogni-
tion of same-sex unions,” for example
22
—invite a more expansive under-
standing of the significance of their work. As one thoughtful commenta-
tor reviewing Punishment Naturalist writings recently concluded:  
Whatever theorists may think people should feel as a normative 
matter, as an empirical matter, members of the public share sur-
prisingly fixed notions of justice in traditional crimes—and espe-
cially the kinds of crimes discussed in a criminal law course. . . . 
From the standpoint of law reform, then, reformers likely need to 
accept these shared intuitions as settled. And from the standpoint 
of teaching criminal law, I would add, professors need to recog-
nize that there are relatively fixed and surprisingly hard-wired 
judgments widely shared in society that help to generate the legal 
rules found in criminal law codes and casebooks.
23 
Accordingly, in this Article, we address Punishment Naturalists’ 
arguments on the assumption that they are intended to have implica-
tions for the pressing and conspicuous issues that are the everyday 
focus of mainstream criminal law scholars and of ordinary citizens 
interested in criminal law. And we show why it would be a mistake for 
anyone to accept that what they have to say counsels against arguing 
for reform of existing law. 
In what follows, we argue that variations in cultural norms per-
vade evaluations of wrongdoing, even within what the Punishment 
Naturalists describe as the “core of wrongdoing.” We explore these 
issues in four Parts. We begin by making the strongest case we can for 
Punishment Naturalism—and that case is tantalizing. It gets many 
things right and taps into deep intuitions that many individuals have 
about justice and the law. So while naturalism is significantly—even 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See generally Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes 
Nothing and Everything, 359 Phil Transactions Royal Socy B: Bio Sci 1775 (2004) (arguing that 
advances in neuroscience will create a shift in people’s intuitions regarding free will and respon-
sibility, resulting in a turn toward consequentialist punishment models).  
 22 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 52–53 (cited in note 15).  
 23 Orin Kerr, The Intuition of Retribution (Feb 17, 2010), online at http://crim.jotwell.com/ 
the-intuition-of-retribution (visited May 1, 2010). 
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fundamentally—flawed, to understand why it is also deeply attractive 
and surprisingly persistent, it is important to acknowledge what it gets 
right and, perhaps more importantly, what it gets nearly right. 
After laying out the naturalist claims, we then describe some of the 
problems that emerge from an examination of the available data. A 
host of studies in the fields that naturalists cite cannot bear the weight 
that naturalists place on them. For the most part, naturalists make the 
same kinds of mistakes that those making grand claims about universal 
human nature have long made: they fail to see the significance of the 
diversity that exists—diversity present not only in many of the studies 
they cite, but even in studies they themselves conduct.  
We then describe Punishment Realism, an alternative approach 
that accounts for more of the available data and, we think, offers more 
practical purchase. Using cross-cultural examples and statistical ana-
lyses, we present a series of cases for which realism offers more de-
tailed and parsimonious explanations than naturalism in two ways. 
First, rather than ignoring or downplaying diversity of intuition about 
wrongdoing, realism suggests that, to the extent that people value per-
sons, objects, and practices differently, they also evaluate injuries to 
and interferences with them differently. Second, rather than positing 
an untestable “moral organ,”
24
 Punishment Realism explains evalua-
tions of wrongdoing with reference to well-established features of 
human cognition that are open to empirical evaluation.  
Finally, we make a pragmatic pitch for the comparative advantage 
that Punishment Realism offers in the face of social dissensus. Where 
Punishment Naturalism suggests that attempting to educate individu-
als away from their instinctual intuitions regarding wrongdoing will be 
either fruitless or exceedingly difficult, Punishment Realism points 
reformers toward the cognitive and social mechanisms of norm forma-
tion. Conflict and dissensus based on differing worldviews will always 
be hard to resolve, but getting the source of the disagreement right, we 
think, is a step in the right direction.  
I.  NATURALISM AND WRONGDOING 
Punishment Naturalism, which holds that our sense of right and 
wrong is largely innate, rests on observations of broadly shared senti-
ments about justice. Generally speaking, when someone commits a 
wrong—murder, rape, theft, or fraud, say—we share an intuitive sense 
that the wrongdoer should be punished. Moreover, we are likely to 
agree that some crimes are far worse than others: all other things 
                                                                                                                           
 24 For a description of the use of the term “moral organ,” see note 28 and accompanying text.  
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equal, a drawn-out, brutal, and deliberate rape-homicide seems worse 
than a quick and impulsive homicide. And just as we can distinguish 
between types of killings quickly and easily, so too can we distinguish 
among more and less serious forms of aggression from murder to rape 
to assault to battery, and the same can be said of theft and fraud: with-
in each extremely general category, we can distinguish more serious 
from less serious cases.  
As Punishment Naturalists note, this highly nuanced set of dis-
tinctions seems to come effortlessly. Where, Punishment Naturalists 
ask, do those intuitions come from? And why are they so widely 
shared? Surely, they answer, it is natural to feel the way we do about 
crime and punishment.
25
 A specialized cognitive module devoted to 
moral evaluations, naturalists argue, would explain both the extent of 
our shared intuitions and the ease with which we arrive at moral 
judgments. Marc Hauser, a professor of psychology at Harvard, cap-
tures the idea in his book, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our 
Universal Sense of Right and Wrong, writing that humans have 
“evolved a moral instinct, a capacity that naturally grows within each 
child, designed to generate rapid judgments about what is morally 
right or wrong based on an unconscious grammar of action.”
26
 
Naturalists deploy a series of analogies to bring this point home. 
Marc Hauser, John Mikhail, and others, extending Noam Chomsky’s 
famous (and famously controversial) analogy of linguistic cognition to 
the functioning of bodily organs,
27 posit a “moral organ” or “module” 
in the mind that provides every normal human with a universal 
“grammar of action,” a generic moral code that underlies the apparent 
                                                                                                                           
 25 While naturalism might seem like a more modest restatement of natural law, it is distinct 
in a number of ways. First and foremost, Punishment Naturalism makes no claims that these 
broadly shared sentiments are anything like a law. Nor does it claim that human intuitions are 
deontologically fair or materially useful; indeed, naturalists acknowledge that intuitions about 
the law may be unfair or counterproductive. On this account there is nothing “natural” about 
justice itself, there is only something “natural” about our intuitions about justice. Another way of 
saying this is that whereas the ambition of a theory of natural law is primarily normative, the 
ambition of Punishment Naturalism is primarily positive. Punishment Naturalists might derive 
practical implications from their research, but their goal is to tell us how humans actually do 
think, not how they should think, about crime and punishment. Punishment Naturalism thus 
dispenses with the philosophical debates of traditional legal theory by making claims that can be 
tested empirically and evaluated in terms of their practical value to policymakers and ordinary 
citizens. See Paul H. Robinson, Empirical Desert, in Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey, and 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, eds, Criminal Law Conversations 29, 38 (Oxford 2009).  
 26 Marc Hauser, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and 
Wrong xvii (HarperCollins 2006). 
 27 See Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (Mouton 1975); Noam Chomsky, Knowledge of 
Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use (Praeger 1986). [FLIP: GET PINS] 
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diversity of values and practices in the world.
28
 Paul Robinson, Robert 
Kurzban, and Owen Jones have similarly argued that “intuitions about 
morality and justice seem to develop” in “the same way that baby 
teeth grow from gums and adult teeth replace baby teeth.”
29
 There is, 
on this account, a sense of right and wrong that, while non-obvious, is 
ever present, governing our evaluations of one another in ways that 
are surprisingly consistent. 
Moreover, Punishment Naturalists argue, the innate nature of our 
intuitions about wrongdoing is of significant practical consequence. The 
fact that our intuitions arise from millions of years of shared evolutio-
nary pressure matters because, if true, attempts to educate individuals 
away from their innate instincts are likely to be controversial, costly, 
and largely ineffective.
30
 Whatever pressures may have produced our 
innate sense of morality over the course of our evolution, they argue, “it 
is [now] beyond the normal influence of culture or demographic. If it 
were not so insulated, one would see differences in intuitions of justice 
among different demographics and cultures.”
31
 Upon reflection, we 
might not like what our instincts tell us; but we should know what these 
instincts are. Highlighting the potential clash between socially con-
structed norms and natural intuitions, they argue that  
policy wonks and politicians should listen more closely to the 
moral voice of our species[; for] in developing policies that dic-
tate what people ought to do, we are more likely to construct 
long-lasting and effective policies if we take into account the in-
tuitive biases that guide our initial responses to the imposition of 
social norms.
32
 
The level of specificity at which the hypothesized innate mechan-
isms operate is crucial. Punishment Realists and Punishment Naturalists 
alike accept some form of innate sensitivity to social norms as part of 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See, for example, Marc D. Hauser, The Liver and the Moral Organ, 1 Soc Cog & Affec-
tive Neurosci 214, 214–15 (2006); Susan Dwyer, How Good Is the Linguistic Analogy?, in Peter 
Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich, eds, 2 The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition 
237, 238 (Oxford 2006). 
 29 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1664 (cited in note 14).  
 30 See Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 18 (cited in note 15) (arguing that “devia-
tions [from humans’ innate intuitions about punishment] can have undesirable consequences and 
unjustified costs that can ultimately hurt rather than help effective crime control”). 
 31 Id at 11.  
 32 Hauser, Moral Minds at xx (cited in note 26). See also Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L 
Rev at 11 (cited in note 15) (“This insulation [from culture] means that there may be serious 
limits on whether and how social engineers can manipulate intuitions of justice, at least those 
intuitions of justice about core wrongdoing upon which there is broad agreement.”). 
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humans’ capacity to learn.
33
 But the form of naturalism that we are de-
scribing rejects the notion that moral intuitions are principally the result 
of generic abilities to develop and act in response to socially con-
structed and shared meanings. The naturalism of the scholars we de-
scribe here, while readily admitting that individuals are made sensitive 
to norms by something like generic cognitive mechanisms, rejects in-
nate-norm-sensitivity accounts as too limited, lacking in specialized 
cognitive mechanisms that supply much of the content of morality. In-
stead, naturalists argue, humans have cognitive features that determine 
the structure of highly predictable and largely invariant intuitions about 
wrongdoing, intuitions that began as advantageous human variations 
among our ancestors and, over centuries, were continually selected and 
refined as collective heritable traits. Although humans are not, on the 
naturalist account, identical moral machines, our innate moral intuitions 
are shared at surprisingly fine levels of granularity because of innate 
cognitive structures rather than socially acquired norms.  
In support of these claims, naturalists offer empirical studies do-
cumenting the extent to which individuals share intuitions about 
whether acts are wrongful and how wrongful they are. They also de-
velop an account of the sources of agreement and disagreement. Let 
us review each claim—the extent of shared intuitions and the source 
of this agreement and disagreement—in turn.  
A. The Extent of Shared Intuitions 
Where crime and punishment are concerned, humans certainly 
appear to disagree quite often; headlines and policy debates are filled, 
it seems, with clashing moral accounts.
34
 Is it possible that there is a 
deeper order lurking within the variance and dissensus that we ob-
serve around us? A growing number of researchers argue that there is 
a structure to our intuitions that is both nuanced and pervasive. Paul 
Robinson and Robert Kurzban, two prominent theorists working in 
the area of criminal law, have developed some of the most striking 
empirical studies supporting naturalist claims. Reviewing dozens of 
studies and conducting several themselves, they write:  
                                                                                                                           
 33 There are dozens of norms-based models of cognition. For a recent review and addition, 
see Chandra Sekhar Sripada and Stephen Stich, A Framework for the Psychology of Norms, in 
Carruthers, Laurence, and Stich, eds, The Innate Mind 280, 289–90 (cited in note 28) (arguing that 
the “acquisition mechanism” people use to observe the existence of a norm “is both automatic 
and involuntary”).  
 34 See, for example, Dan M. Kahan and Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of 
Self-Defense, 45 Am Crim L Rev 1, 6–8 (2008) (listing potentially clashing justifications for self-
defense doctrine). 
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[A]vailable evidence suggests that human intuitions of justice 
about core wrongdoing . . . are deep, predictable, and widely 
shared. While there are disagreements about the relative blame-
worthiness of wrongdoing outside the core, the core wrongs 
themselves—physical aggression, takings without consent, and 
deception in exchanges—are the subject of nuanced and specific 
intuitions that cut across demographics.
35 
The studies to which Robinson, Kurzban, and other naturalists cite 
involve participants who have been asked to rank the seriousness of 
offenses. The remarkable thing about such ranking exercises, they sug-
gest, is the relatively stable rank order of the offenses evaluated by 
participants.  
Consider the following sample from one recent study conducted 
by Robinson and Kurzban. Topping out the serious end of the spec-
trum is kidnapping an eight-year-old girl for ransom, raping her, re-
cording her screams while burning her with a cigarette lighter, and 
then killing her once a demanded ransom is received. Consistently 
ranked as less serious than that is keeping pitbulls that escape repeat-
edly and ultimately kill someone. Less serious than that is slapping 
(and thus bruising) a man wearing a hat that makes fun of the defen-
dant’s favorite band. Less serious still is stealing a drill from a garage. 
And at the bottom of the culpability spectrum is taking (without eat-
ing) two whole pies from an “all you can eat” buffet.
36
  
That list is not exhaustive; the study includes over twenty acts 
that participants rank, and which they rank with a very high degree of 
consistency and ease. (A full listing of the offenses is provided in the 
Appendix.) How consistently do members of the public rank these 
offenses? Participants agreed on 91.8 percent of all pairwise judg-
ments, and the ranking produces a Kendall’s W of 0.88.
37
 As you might 
imagine, the most common disagreements were on those acts that 
were ranked just next to one another. When the researchers dis-
counted the “flipping” of adjacent offenses, the extent of agreement 
rose to 93.9 percent.
38
  
A summary of the scenarios and their rankings is provided in Ta-
ble 1, below, and full descriptions are provided in the Appendix. No-
tice that the first four scenarios were generally thought to deserve no 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1892 (cited in note 13). 
 36 Id at 1869 (providing a table ranking behavior according to the amount of punishment 
the study’s subjects believed was warranted).  
 37 Id at 1877–78.  
 38 Id at 1878 (noting that one-third of all deviations were “adjacent flip” deviations). 
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punishment and thus are unranked. The following offenses are listed 
in order of ranked seriousness. 
TABLE 1.  RANKINGS OF RELATIVE WRONGFULNESS BY VARIOUS 
DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS.
39 
Act 
All 
Subjects Male 
 
Female
Non-
white 
<$60K  
Income* 
>$60K  
Income* 
<2yr  
Degree 
>2yr  
Degree 
Self-defense   0† 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coerced theft 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Umbrella mistake 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hallucination 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pies 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Short change 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 6 
T-shirt 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 
Radio theft 8 8 8 7,8‡ 8 8 8 8 
Drill theft 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Microwave theft 10 10 11 11 10 10 11 10 
TV destruction 11 11 11 8 11 11 11 11 
Slap 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Head-butt 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Stitches 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 15 
Necklace & Stitches 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 
Robbery 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Clubbing 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Pit bulls 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Infant 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Stabbing 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Ambush 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Abduction 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Burning 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Ransom 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
N = 246 123 123 53 103 103 169 77 
* Forty-one subjects did not provide income information. 
† “No punishment” as the modal response is shown as 0. 
‡ The two ranks were a tie, thus both modes are reported. 
 
Not only are the rankings highly consistent, but the researchers 
found “little variation in the modes of scenario rankings”
40
 across a 
broad array of demographic variables (arrayed across the top of Table 
1 above). In addition to these demographic variables, the researchers 
also report that an “investigation of . . . political party, ideology, marit-
al status, whether they have children, religion, level of religious activi-
ty, [and] libertarianism showed a similar lack of any meaningful differ-
ence between demographic groups’ modal rankings.”
41
 
The acts ranked here are also, Robinson and Kurzban claim, 
broadly representative of criminal wrongdoing more generally. While 
they concede that individuals disagree about the wrongfulness of some 
acts, these divisive acts are outside of what the researchers consider to 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1879 (cited in note 13). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id at 1879 n 200. 
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be the “core” of wrongdoing: “physical aggression, takings without 
consent, and deceit in exchange.”
42
 The core, by Robinson and Kurz-
ban’s estimation, comprises the vast majority of criminal conduct: 
“94.9% of the offenses committed in the United States.”
43
  
Nor are these findings specific to a single time or place. While 
Robinson and Kurzban’s is the most striking of recent studies con-
ducted in the United States, ranking studies of this sort have been 
conducted for over forty years and in a number of countries with simi-
lar results. Thorsten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang’s classic 1964 study 
demonstrated that Americans consistently ranked many crimes in the 
same order, and that these could be reliably reported as an index of 
crime seriousness.
44
 Dogan Akman and Andre Normandeau’s 1967 
study reported similar findings across a dozen samples taken from 
various Canadian locales, concluding that rankings of many offenses 
were stable and reliable enough to construct a crime index for Cana-
da.
45
 In 1980 Sandra Evans and Joseph Scott reported that American 
and Kuwaiti students ranked many offenses and punishments similar-
ly.
46
 And in 2006, Sergio Herzog reported remarkable similarities in the 
rankings of offense seriousness across cultural groups in his study of 
Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews.
47
  
Robinson and Kurzban are careful to note that agreement on the 
relative seriousness of various forms of wrongdoing is not equivalent to 
agreement on how to punish in absolute terms. Some individuals may be 
more punitive than others overall, generating disagreement that has 
long masked the pervasive structure of our punishment intuitions about 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Id at 1892. 
 43 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1867 (cited in note 13). 
 44 See generally Thorsten Sellin and Marvin E. Wolfgang, The Measurement of Delinquen-
cy 263–65 (Wiley 1964) (finding similar rankings among judges, police officers, and two groups of 
students, despite their positions in very “different sociocultural groups”). Several studies have 
since replicated and extended these findings in the United States. See, for example, Don C. Gib-
bons, Crime and Punishment: A Study in Social Attitudes, 47 Soc Forces 391, 395 (1969) (studying 
proposed sentences among Californians and finding general agreement on which crimes should 
get severe versus more moderate punishment); Peter H. Rossi, et al, The Seriousness of Crimes: 
Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 Am Soc Rev 224, 230–31 (1974) (finding 
broad agreement on assessments of crime seriousness among residents of Baltimore regardless 
of race, sex, or educational attainment); Stephen D. Gottfredson, Kathy L. Young, and William S. 
Laufer, Additivity and Interactions in Offense Seriousness Scales, 17 J Rsrch Crime & Delinq 26, 
29 (1980) (studying the relative-seriousness rankings of several criminal offenses by undergra-
duate and graduate students at Johns Hopkins University). See also Monica A. Walker, Measur-
ing the Seriousness of Crimes, 18 Brit J Criminol 348, 348–51 (1978). But see Parts II–III.  
 45 See Dogan D. Akman and Andre Normandeau, The Measurement of Crime and Delin-
quency in Canada, 7 Brit J Criminol 129, 147 (1967).  
 46 See Sandra S. Evans and Joseph E. Scott, The Seriousness of Crime Cross-Culturally, 22 
Criminol 39, 48–49 (1980).  
 47 See Sergio Herzog, Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness: A Comparison of Social 
Divisions in Israel, 39 Isr L Rev 57, 59, 66 (2006). 
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wrongfulness. To use the analogy to Chomskian “universal grammar” 
that many naturalists employ, the relative order in which wrongdoings 
are ranked is a “principle” determined by a moral mechanism or 
module in the brain, and the amount of punishment to be meted out—
the “end point[s] of the punishment continuum,” as Robinson and 
Kurzban call them
48
—are “parameters” that may be set by culture, ex-
perience, and other non-innate influences on preference.
49
  
On the naturalist account, then, while we may disagree over some 
things, this superficial dissensus masks the deeper structure of our 
shared intuitions. Looking for the kinds of serious disagreements that 
are often described as refuting naturalist accounts, Robinson and 
Kurzban report having “failed to find the limits of shared intuitions of 
justice for core wrongdoing.”
50
 The levels of agreement in rank order-
ing are, they argue, “astonishingly high.”
51
  
B. The Source of Shared Intuitions 
Researchers involved in these studies describe the degree of 
shared intuitions about wrongdoing and punishment as “stunning[],”
52
 
“remarkable,”
53
 “striking,”
54
 and even “shock[ing].”
55
 To explain the ex-
traordinary concordance they see, they develop an evolutionary theory 
of human psychology. By and large, they propose one or more specia-
lized cognitive mechanisms developed in response to evolutionary pres-
sures. As Marc Hauser writes: “Part of [our natural sense of justice] was 
designed by the blind hand of Darwinian selection millions of years 
before our species evolved; other parts were added or upgraded over 
the evolutionary history of our species, and are unique both to humans 
and to our moral psychology.”
56
 For naturalists, developing a moral sen-
sibility over the course of a lifetime is “like growing a limb”
57
—a highly 
specialized form that normally develops in a predictable manner. 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1855 (cited in note 13). 
 49 Hauser develops this concept extensively. See Hauser, Moral Minds at 419–20 (cited in 
note 26). 
 50 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1867 (cited in note 13).  
 51 Id. 
 52 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1654 (cited in note 14). 
 53 Evans and Scott, 22 Criminol at 53 (cited in note 46).  
 54 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1638 (cited in note 14). See also Robin-
son and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1867–74 (cited in note 13). 
 55 Joss Whedon, dir, Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog Act 2, 00:11:59 (2008), online at 
http://drhorrible.com (visited May 1, 2010) (“All the time that you beat me unconscious I forgive 
/  . . . It’s a brand new me / I got no remorse / Now the water’s rising / . . . I’m gonna shock the 
world / Gonna show Bad Horse.”). 
 56 Hauser, Moral Minds at xvii (cited in note 26).  
 57 Id at xviii (clarifying that the acquisition of moral norms does not occur through formal 
education).  
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The advantages that these intuitions provide are often not specif-
ic to an individual, they argue, but rather accrue to kin groups, to local 
populations, or to the species as a whole. Thus, while it may be costly 
for an individual to demand or inflict punishment on another for a 
core wrongdoing, overall the group to which that individual belongs 
(and, presumably, within which she has many genetic relatives) will 
thrive if she does. Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones develop a specific 
conception of the mechanism by which our shared intuitions have 
evolved, one that rests on the conditions of mutual interdependence 
and social interaction:  
We argue . . . that human sociality has laid the foundation for an 
evolved predisposition to acquire shared intuitions of justice and 
that such intuitions benefit the individuals bearing them. . . . 
[E]volution has in particular contributed to intuitions that physi-
cal harm, the taking of property, and cheating in exchanges are 
matters for particular attention and condemnation.
58 
Another way to put this is that specific forms of antisocial behavior 
are evolutionarily counterproductive, so groups (and individuals in 
groups) that have innate rules that foster cooperation—including co-
operation around punishment—are more likely to thrive.  
In support of this theory, researchers commonly cite two pools of 
evidence:
59
 experimental games of cooperation and punishment among 
humans, and studies that turn on distinctions between moral and con-
ventional wrongdoing. We review each of these in turn.  
1. Fairness games. 
Consider, first, one of the most common tools for assessing how 
individuals assess fairness and how much they are willing to sacrifice 
to punish someone who is behaving unfairly: the “Ultimatum Game.”
60
 
The structure of the game is simple. Two people—a “Proposer” and a 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1646 (cited in note 14). 
 59 Naturalists provide other evidence, though in general it tends to be at a greater inferen-
tial remove. Brain imaging studies, for example, are cited quite often. While these studies do 
provide insight into which regions of the brain (it is usually multiple regions) are most active 
when individuals are attempting to resolve various problems, they do not provide much in the 
way of evidence about whether the content is innate or learned. There is, so far as we can discern, 
no evidence that moral decisions are made exclusively or even predominantly by regions of the 
brain that are responsive to only “innate,” as opposed to “learned,” intuitions. See id at 1659–64 
(arguing, based on neurological studies, that “basic moral sentiments humans share are products 
of evolutionary processes”). See also id at 1655–59 (providing evidence from animal studies); id 
at 1664–74 (providing evidence from studies of child development). 
 60 Joseph Henrich, et al, “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Expe-
riments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 Behav & Brain Sci 795, 798 (2005).  
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“Responder”—are anonymously paired. The Proposer is offered a 
modest or significant amount of money. She then proposes a split of 
the money with the Responder. The Responder decides whether to 
accept the split or reject it. If she accepts, both will get the amount 
allocated by the proposed split. If she rejects, neither gets anything. 
One common interpretation of such a rejection is that it is a form of 
punishment that the Responder visits on the Proposer for being un-
fair, a punishment that costs whatever the Responder would have re-
ceived had she accepted the Proposer’s suggested split.  
If humans are selfish actors in the way neoclassical economics po-
sits, then the Responder would never reject an offer greater than zero, 
no matter how small. Why? A rational Responder should accept an of-
fer of any size because some money, no matter how little, is better than 
no money. As such, every neoclassically rational and selfish Proposer 
would offer as little as possible, keeping the lion’s share for herself.  
Yet in most studies of industrialized societies, the mean offer is be-
tween 40 percent and 50 percent.
61
 Moreover, if Proposers offer signifi-
cantly less than this, Responders tend to reject the offers in proportion 
to their divergence from the norm. But few people make such low of-
fers.
62
 Indeed, experimenters often had to add in random offers to test 
the lower bounds of what a Responder would accept because Proposers 
deviated from the mode so rarely and, when they did, by very little. The 
consistency of these findings across a range of settings led many re-
searchers to posit a “taste” for fairness at approximately these levels.
63
  
Marc Hauser has conducted a number of studies of the Ultimatum 
Game. In a recent version broadcast on national television,
64
 for exam-
ple, he gave half of a group of students some Skittles candies and had 
them determine whether and how many they wanted to share with 
those who were given none. To a person, they all gave half. The reason? 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id at 801.  
 62 Id at 797 (characterizing the infrequent nature of low offers as demonstrative of fairness 
and concerns of reciprocity). 
 63 See, for example, James Konow, A Positive Theory of Economic Fairness, 31 J Econ 
Behav & Org 13, 32–33 (1996) (identifying accountability, altruism, and efficiency as important 
motivators); Gary E. Bolton and Rami Zwick, Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bar-
gaining, 10 Games & Econ Behav 95, 113 (1995) (arguing that “punishment for unfair treatment” 
accounted for most of the variation from perfect equilibrium play in the study’s results); Colin 
Camerer and Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J Econ Persp 
209, 216 (1995) (explaining that etiquette and perceived norms of fairness often overcome in-
come maximization as motives in the Ultimatum Game); Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, 
in John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, eds, The Handbook of Experimental Economics 253, 264–65 
(Princeton 1995) (detailing types of bargaining experiments and noting that some theorists have 
rallied around the explanatory power of fairness considerations). 
 64 See “Modern Morality: Inside the Brain,” ABC News (ABC television broadcast, 
May 2, 2007). 
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When pressed, the students gave explanations that seem either intuitive 
or like a confabulation to most people: “Because then . . . you all get the 
same amount.”
65
 To them, it was just natural to share equally.  
Like Hauser, most naturalists describe the typical deviation from 
the rational-actor model in evolutionary terms. The argument for na-
turalism based on these games is that natural selection has crafted a 
sense of fairness in humans that might be modified modestly by expe-
rience but is essentially innate. Fairness, on this account, is no more 
cultural than any other human organ; instead, it is an organic “moral 
faculty—an organ of the mind that carries a universal grammar of ac-
tion.”
66
 On this account, the limited range of fairness is part of human 
adaptive fitness, and the “architecture of our mind, leftover circuitry 
from the cavemen.”
67
  
Hauser’s theory also comes with at least one prediction. Because 
these constraints on fairness have long been essential to our survival, 
he argues that “no culture will ever [accept] offers under 15 percent, 
and no culture will ever offer more than 50 percent. If they do, such 
patterns will exist for the blink of an eye in human history.”
68
 We re-
turn to Hauser’s claim later, as it shares a form of logical error com-
mon to many naturalist claims about punishment and human intuition.  
2. Conventional and moral wrongdoing. 
A second body of work cited as supporting the naturalist account 
derives from empirical studies distinguishing “moral” from “convention-
al” wrongdoing,
69
 a distinction that roughly tracks the legal distinction 
between acts that are traditionally described in legal parlance as mala in 
se and mala prohibita.
70
 Following Elliot Turiel, Judith Smetana, and 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Id.  
 66 Hauser, Moral Minds at 11 (cited in note 26). 
 67 Id at 85–86.  
 68 We have corrected a typo here; Hauser writes: “no culture will ever reject offers under 15 
percent,” id at 85, but that cannot be what he means because most do. But see notes 119–29 and 
accompanying text (critiquing this form of hypothesizing in general and describing experiments 
among the Sukuma in Mahenge, Tanzania that exceed Hauser’s hypothesized bounds on fairness).  
 69 For early research in this area, see generally Larry P. Nucci and Elliot Turiel, Social 
Interactions and the Development of Social Concepts in Preschool Children, 49 Child Dev 400 
(1978); Judith G. Smetana, Preschool Children’s Conceptions of Moral and Social Rules, 52 Child 
Dev 1333 (1981); Larry P. Nucci and Maria Santiago Nucci, Children’s Social Interactions in the 
Context of Moral and Conventional Transgressions, 53 Child Dev 403 (1982). Some, following 
Turiel, suggest a third category of “personal” wrongs. See, for example, Jenny Yau and Judith G. 
Smetana, Conceptions of Moral, Social-Conventional, and Personal Events among Chinese Pre-
schoolers in Hong Kong, 74 Child Dev 647 (2003). 
 70 Many legal scholars have argued that a context-independent distinction between the two 
is impossible. See, for example, Peter Alldridge, Making Criminal Law Known, in Stephen C. 
Shute and A.P. Simester, eds, Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part 103, 106–10 
(Oxford 2002) (discussing the difficulties of distinguishing these categories, particularly when 
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Larry Nucci’s early empirical work in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
71
 
these studies suggest that humans, in the course of normal develop-
ment, learn to distinguish moral wrongs, which implicate “justice, 
rights, or welfare” (hitting, stealing, or refusing to share an abundant 
good, for example), from conventional wrongs, which merely violate a 
local convention (wearing pajamas to school or work, swearing, or 
eating lunch while standing up, for example). Conventional transgres-
sions are thought to be less serious, and assessments of their serious-
ness are dependent on context and rules set by authorities; moral 
transgressions, on the other hand, are thought to be more serious, typ-
ically involving clear harm to a victim, and the seriousness of the 
transgression is thought to be “authority independent”—that is, it 
does not depend on what any authority says is acceptable.
72
  
Naturalists often cite studies of moral and conventional wrongs 
showing that children appear to learn that hurting others is wrong 
before they learn other norms. For example, the finding that “the first 
moral concept to appear in children is the concept that physical ag-
gression is wrong” is relevant, Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones argue, 
because it seems “likely more than coincidence that this is also the 
first step in [a naturalist] account of the evolutionary origins of intuitive 
justice.”
73
 That is, the development of morality in childhood parallels 
                                                                                                                           
applied to market situations where it is unclear whether the legal rule is simply “declaring the 
pre-legal public wrongfulness of the actions in question”); Nancy Travis Wolfe, Mala In Se: A 
Disappearing Doctrine?, 19 Criminol 131, 139–40 (1981) (arguing that mala prohibita offenses 
are different from mala in se offenses only in that the legislatures have labeled them as such).  
 71 See Larry P. Nucci, Conceptual Development in the Moral and Conventional Domains: 
Implications for Values Education, 52 Rev Educ Rsrch 93, 100 (1982) (describing early studies by 
Turiel, Nucci, and Smetana in which subjects evaluated less wrongful actions “in terms of their 
relation to the social order, social expectations, social institutions, and contextual or culturally 
specific regulations and standards of behavior” and more wrongful actions “in terms of the ef-
fects the actions had on the rights or well-being of others”).  
 72 There are several good reviews of the literature. See, for example, Judith G. Smetana, 
Understanding of Social Rules, in Mark Bennett, ed, The Development of Social Cognition: The 
Child as Psychologist 111, 112–14 (Guilford 1993); Marie S. Tisak, Domains of Social Reasoning 
and Beyond, in Ross Vasta, ed, 11 Annals of Child Development 95, 100–01 (Jessica Kingsley 
1995); Larry P. Nucci, Education in the Moral Domain 7–9 (Cambridge 2001). See generally 
Larry P. Nucci, Elliot Turiel, and Gloria Encarnacion-Gawrych, Children’s Social Interactions and 
Social Concepts: Analyses of Morality and Convention in the Virgin Islands, 14 J Cross-Cult Psych 
469 (1983) (finding that adults and preschoolers from the Virgin Islands responded to “moral 
transgressions” by pointing out the hurtful or unjust consequences of the actions upon victims, 
but reacted to “conventional” transgressions by referring back to aspects of the social order); 
Marida Hollos, Philip E. Leis, and Elliot Turiel, Social Reasoning in Ijo Children and Adolescents 
in Nigerian Communities, 17 J Cross-Cult Psych 352 (1986) (finding that Nigerian children’s 
“moral” and “conventional” judgments can be distinguished along similar axes); Yau and Smeta-
na, 74 Child Dev at 647 (cited in note 69) (finding that Chinese preschool children also treated 
“personal,” “moral,” and “conventional” events differently). 
 73 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1670 (cited in note 14). 
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the evolutionary development of the moral organ.
74
 Lack of coopera-
tion around physical aggression would, on this account, pose especially 
grave risks to survival, so intuitions governing its regulation would be 
the most fundamental and earliest to develop. 
Over the last quarter century, several researchers have reported 
similar patterns across a diverse set of subjects ranging in age from 
toddlers as young as three and one-half years to adults, with a substan-
tial array of different nationalities and religions.
75
 Reading these stu-
dies, naturalists have drawn the inference that these distinctions be-
tween moral and conventional wrongs are “universally recognized, 
similar among boys and girls, and even consistent in cultures with 
seemingly different parental styles—in China and the United States.”
76
  
Moreover, they argue, because these studies tend to show that 
“moral rules are inviolable and universally applicable,”
77
 they can be 
taken as evidence of an “evolutionary explanation for the origins of 
intuitions of justice.”
78
  
In light of the universal nature of these intuitions, naturalists sug-
gest that the alternative is simply implausible:  
If there were no specific developmental system for the acquisi-
tion of moral intuitions, if intuitions of justice were simply a mat-
ter of general social learning, then the developmental route of 
the acquisition of intuitions of justice would depend on the envi-
ronment in which the child developed. The things that the child 
learned were wrong would include acts the child witnessed, ideas 
communicated through language, pedagogy from various sources, 
and so forth. Because all of these elements are likely to differ 
widely across cultures, and even across family and peer groups 
                                                                                                                           
 74 This argument echoes Ernst Haeckel’s fascinating recapitulation theory, which (incor-
rectly) held that “ontogeny recapitulated phylogeny”—that is, that the physical development of 
each human over the course of its lifetime parallels the evolutionary development of the species. 
See Stephen Jay Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny 7–9 (Belknap 1977) (discussing the origins of 
the recapitulation theory and arguing that it collapsed once “Mendelian genetics repudiated the 
generality of its two necessary principles—terminal addition and condensation”).  
 75 See Nucci, Turiel, and Encarnacion-Gawrych, 14 J Cross-Cult Psych at 469 (cited in note 
72) (studying Virgin Islands children and adults); Hollos, Leis, and Turiel, 17 J Cross-Cult Psych at 
352 (cited in note 72) (studying Nigerian children); Yau and Smetana, 74 Child Dev at 647 (cited in 
note 69) (studying Hong Kong preschoolers). For reviews, see Smetana, Understanding of Social 
Rules at 126–33 (cited in note 72) (discussing research in various domestic contexts as well as in 
such countries as Japan and Zambia); Tisak, Domains of Social Reasoning and Beyond at 103 (cited 
in note 72) (discussing results across age ranges); Nucci, Education in the Moral Domain at 20–51, 
94–106 (cited in note 72) (discussing results across a variety of religions and cultures). 
 76 Hauser, Moral Minds at 291 (cited in note 26).  
 77 Id at 292.  
 78 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1666 (cited in note 14) (finding colla-
teral support for this explanation in evidence that “children everywhere progress through similar 
stages of moral reasoning about justice at roughly the same ages”).  
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within cultures, such a general learning system would yield very 
different paths and timing in the acquisition of intuitions of jus-
tice for different individuals.
79
 
In short, they argue, there is profound agreement on the core moral 
wrongs that we confront, and that agreement appears to be intuitive, 
nuanced, and organic—in all probability the product of a specialized 
and innate cognitive moral organ that has developed over millions of 
years through natural selection.  
II.  PROBLEMS WITH NATURALISM 
Naturalists have assembled an impressive collection of studies in 
support of their claims, and the literature on precisely which aspects of 
morality are innate has become a booming cottage industry.
80
 Moreo-
ver, they do so by referencing empirical data, which is surely an ad-
vance on many earlier anecdotal studies.
81
 But they face a host of 
problems. Some stem from simple logical missteps that underlie their 
most strident claims. A more serious problem is posed by empirical 
evidence contradicting the central claim that evaluations of serious 
wrongfulness do not vary across social conditions or individuals. Set-
ting up the discussion of Punishment Realism in Part III, this Part 
starts with a few basic examples that give a sense of the research that 
naturalists have overlooked or failed to incorporate, then describes 
some of their broader logical errors.
82
  
                                                                                                                           
 79 Id. 
 80 See generally Erica Roedder and Gilbert Harman, Grammar, in Doris, Nichols, and 
Stich, eds, Empirical Moral Psychology (Oxford forthcoming 2010); Ron Mallon, Reviving 
Rawls’s Linguistic Analogy Inside and Out, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed, 2 Moral Psychology: 
The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity 145 (MIT 2008); Jesse Prinz, Resisting 
the Linguistic Analogy: A Commentary on Hauser, Young, and Cushman, in Sinnott-Armstrong, 
ed, The Cognitive Science of Morality 157 (rejecting the analogy to Noam Chomsky’s “universal 
grammar” by suggesting that “general-purpose emotion systems and socially transmitted rules” 
could be an alternate explanation for the empirical findings of Hauser and others); Frances 
Myrna Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm (Oxford 2007); 
John Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future, 11 Trends Cog Sci 
143 (2007); Hauser, Moral Minds (cited in note 26).  
 81 See generally Robinson, Empirical Desert (cited in note 25) (describing the relative 
virtues of empirical conceptions of desert). 
 82 We do not mean to select Paul Robinson, Robert Kurzban, John Darley, and Owen 
Jones for special scrutiny; in fact, they are to be applauded for presenting claims in a manner that 
is amenable to critical examination and testing. Other naturalists who cite many of the same 
studies theorize a “universal moral grammar” that has, so far as we can tell, no rules that can 
actually be tested. As Michael Waldmann has noted, the notion of a universal moral grammar is 
developed without an explanation of what, exactly, distinguishes the rules from parameters in the 
proposed universal moral grammar:  
Findings that show that different cultures generate similar intuitions . . . are viewed as evi-
dence for universal rules, whereas other studies showing huge cultural differences are in-
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A. Some Skepticism about Scope  
One of the first major hurdles that naturalism faces is the tre-
mendous scope of disagreement over what constitutes wrongdoing. Na-
turalists’ principle strategy is to suggest that the disagreements are rela-
tively minor and cloud our view of the inner workings of moral intui-
tion. There are disagreements about crimes, they concede, but these are 
marginal crimes, relatively infrequent when compared to the “core” 
crimes on which there is significant agreement. As noted above, Robin-
son and Kurzban, drawing on data from the National Criminal Victimi-
zation Survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, claim that 
the “kinds of offenses in the scenarios” they study “represent 94.9% of 
the offenses committed in the United States.”
83
 As such, the kinds of 
offenses on which people disagree are necessarily less common.  
But is the public really in agreement about the relative seriousness 
of the vast majority of bad acts committed in the United States? Any-
one familiar with the source of these data will immediately recognize 
one problem with the claim: a survey of criminal victimization does not 
include any so-called “victimless” or “vice” crimes—crimes over which 
there is tremendous public disagreement.
84
 As indicated in Tables 2 and 
3 below, the incidence of these crimes greatly outnumbers the incidence 
of criminal victimizations. Indeed, the number of people estimated to be 
using marijuana in the last year alone exceeded the number of all those 
estimated to have suffered criminal victimization of any kind. Add pros-
titution (recent studies find that more than one in six adult males has 
paid for sex
85
) and you begin to see just how common controversial 
crimes are. Also excluded from the list are a number of regulatory 
crimes. While far harder to estimate, surveys suggest that rates of willful 
tax evasion—the seriousness of which is also disputed—run as high as 
25 percent of the population.
86
 
                                                                                                                           
terpreted as evidence for the role of parameters. This flexibility of the theory makes it hard 
to envision what could constitute a strict empirical test of the theory.  
Indeed, many of the empirical studies [cited] could even be taken as evidence against the 
moral grammar view. 
Michael R. Waldmann, A Case for the Moral Organ?, 314 Sci 57, 57 (2006). 
 83 See note 43 and accompanying text.  
 84 Whether or not they are actually “victimless” is one of the points of contention. 
 85 See sources cited in note 91. 
 86 See Robert Mason and Lyle D. Calvin, A Study of Admitted Income Tax Evasion, 13 L & 
Socy Rev 73, 80–81 (1978) (reporting that 24.2 percent of survey respondents had either over-
stated deductions, underreported income, or failed to file altogether). 
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TABLE 2.  INCIDENCE OF CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION: 2006
87
 
TABLE 3.  INCIDENCE OF VICE CRIMES 
Crime Incidence
Marijuana use
88
 16,700,000/mo
Underage drinking
89
 27.2% of 12–20 year-olds
Tax evasion
90
 24% of adults
Paying for sex
91
 15% of adult men
 
These estimates are, of course, quite rough. But the point stands: 
even if we were to add only those crimes listed in Table 3—and there 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Statistics for all crimes but murder taken from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National 
Crime Victimization Survey for 2006. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization in 
the United States, 2006 Statistical Tables 14 table 1 (Aug 2008), online at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/cvus06.pdf (visited May 1, 2010). Murder Statistics taken from the 2006 Uniform 
Crime Report. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report: Crime in the United 
States, 2006: Murder *2 (Sept 2007), online at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/documents/ 
murdermain.pdf (visited May 1, 2010). 
 88 US Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration, 1 Results from the 2009 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: 
Summary of National Findings 13 (Sept 2010), online at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/ 
2k9NSDUH/2k9ResultsP.pdf (visited Sept 24, 2010). 
 89 Id at 35.  
 90 Mason and Calvin, 13 L & Socy Rev at 80–81 (cited in note 86) (reporting a tax evasion 
rate of 24.2 percent).  
 91 Robert T. Michael, et al, Sex in America: A Definitive Survey 63 (Little, Brown 1994). See 
also ABC News Primetime Live, The American Sex Survey: A Peek beneath the Sheets 1 (Oct 21, 
2004), online at http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/959a1AmericanSexSurvey.pdf (visited 
May 1, 2010) (indicating that 15 percent of all men report that they have “paid for sex”). Of 
course, given the continued illegality in the United States of all of the activities described in 
Table 3, it is likely that all of these numbers are underreported. Consider also Andre Jeannin, et 
al, Patterns of Sex Work Contact among Men in the General Population of Switzerland, 1987–
2000, 84 Sexually Transmitted Infections 556, 556 (2008) (indicating that 23 percent of Swiss men 
between the ages of 31 and 45 reported purchasing sex from a prostitute); Theo Sandfort, et al, 
Sexual Behavior and HIV Risk: Common Patterns and Differences between European Countries, 
in Michel Hubert, Nathalie Bajos, and Theo Sandfort, eds, Sexual Behaviour and HIV/AIDS in 
Europe: Comparisons of National Surveys 403, 410 (UCL 1998) (indicating that 38.6 percent of 
adult men in Spain reported paying for sex in their lifetime). 
Criminal Victimization Incidence
Murder 17,034
Rape/Sexual assault 260,940
Robbery 712,610
Assault 5,120,840
Household burglary 3,560,920
Motor vehicle theft 992,260
Theft 14,362,570
Any criminal victimization 25,200,384
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are many more that could be added
92
—the crimes of the sort that na-
turalists believe form stable rankings turn out to be in the minority 
rather than the majority. 
Another reason to be skeptical of the suggestion that we share in-
tuitions about most classes of wrongful acts is that the classes of acts 
listed also exclude acts that a substantial number of Americans believe 
should be crimes, but which are not—a few of which are summarized 
in Table 4 below. For example, while hard to estimate with a high de-
gree of accuracy, most researchers estimate that there are over one 
million abortions performed each year in the United States.
93 Sodomy, 
which was illegal until quite recently in many jurisdictions, is esti-
mated to be more common among men and women, both straight and 
gay, than all violent crime, property crime, and illegal drug use com-
bined.
94
 Similarly, more people possess and view pornography than are 
listed as victims of all the crimes in the statistics that Robinson and 
Kurzban cite.
95
 Nor does the “core” cover the failure to assist others 
who are in need—for example, in instances where a person could help 
a small child who is being abused but does not.
96
 These noncriminal 
acts should also be considered when estimating the extent of agree-
ment because the theoretical question being addressed is not about 
what happens to be listed in a victimization survey, but about what 
kind of wrongdoing is considered serious.  
                                                                                                                           
 92 Child pornography, narcotics use and distribution, public urination, and indecent expo-
sure, to name just a few.  
 93 See, for example, Rachel K. Jones, et al, Abortion in the United States: Incidence and 
Access to Services, 2005, 40 Persp Sex & Repro Health 6, 9 (2008) (estimating that 1,206,200 
abortions were performed in 2005); Lawrence B. Finer and Stanley K. Henshaw, Estimates of U.S. 
Abortion Incidence, 2001–2003 *2 (Aug 3, 2006), online at http://www.guttmacher.org/ 
pubs/2006/08/03/ab_incidence.pdf (visited Sept 25, 2010) (estimating that 1,287,000 abortions 
were performed in 2003). See also Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Abortion Surveil-
lance—United States, 2006 (Nov 27, 2009), online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/ 
mmwrhtml/ss5808a1.htm?s_cid=ss5808a1_e (visited Sept 25, 2010) (estimating that 846,181 
abortions were performed in 2006). But see Rachael K. Jones, et al, Trends in Abortion in the 
United States, 52 Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology 119, 120 (2009) (criticizing the CDC data as 
unreliable due to underreporting). 
 94 See William D. Mosher, Anjani Chandra, and Jo Jones, Sexual Behavior and Selected Health 
Measures: Men and Women 15–44 Years of Age, United States, 2002, Adv Data Vital & Health Stats 
25 (Sept 15, 2005), online at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad362.pdf (visited May 1, 2010) (indi-
cating that 40 percent of men and 35 percent of women reported having had anal sex by age forty-
four). See also William Saletan, Ass Backwards: The Media’s Silence about Rampant Anal Sex, Slate 
(Sept 20, 2005), online at http://www.slate.com/id/2126643 (visited May 1, 2010). 
 95 ABC News Primetime Live, The American Sex Survey at 2 (cited in note 91) (indicating 
that one in five respondents reported having looked at pornography on the Internet). 
 96 See Stacy Finz, Killing of Girl, 7, in Casino Spurs Good Samaritan Bills, SF Chron A21 
(Dec 9, 1998) (observing that the inability to charge a college student for his failure to either 
prevent or report the murder of a young girl prompted the legislative introduction of reporting 
requirements in California).  
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TABLE 4. ESTIMATED INCIDENCE OF CONTROVERSIAL 
NONCRIMINAL ACTS 
 
How do we know that people disagree about the seriousness of 
these criminal and noncriminal acts? For starters, different communi-
ties regulate these activities in a wide variety of ways. Prostitution is 
legal in Nevada, but not in New York;
101
 Internet gambling is legal in 
New York, but not in Louisiana;
102
 nude performances are illegal in 
Iowa,
103 but not in California;104 failing to help someone who is in grave 
danger when you can do so without much trouble is not punished in 
California, but it is in Vermont.
105
  
But even more convincing is evidence from experiments con-
ducted by Robinson and Kurzban themselves, reported in the same 
                                                                                                                           
 97 People engaging in sodomy per year (presumably some engage in it more than once a 
year). See Michael, et al, Sex in America at 140 (cited in note 91) (observing that 10 percent of 
men and 9 percent of women have engaged in anal sex within the past twelve months). 
 98 Jones, et al, 40 Persp Sex & Repro Health at 9 (cited in note 93). 
 99 People viewing online pornography per month. See Timothy Egan, Erotica Inc: A Special 
Report: Technology Sent Wall Street into Market for Pornography, NY Times A1 (Oct 23, 2000). 
 100 National Opinion Research Center, Report to the National Gambling Impact Study Com-
mission 8 (Apr 1, 1999), online at http://www2.norc.org/new/gamb-fin.htm (visited May 1, 2010) 
(showing that 60 percent of women and 67 percent of men had gambled in the previous year). 
 101 Compare Nev Rev Stat § 244.345 with NY Penal Law § 230.00 (McKinney). Rhode 
Island only recently barred citizens from paying money for sex, but street solicitation and the 
operation of brothels were already prohibited. See Associated Press, Rhode Island: New Prostitu-
tion Law, NY Times A17 (Nov 4, 2009).   
 102 Compare NY Penal Law §§ 225.00, 225.05, 225.10 (McKinney) (regulating only certain 
gambling activities) with La Rev Stat Ann § 14:90.3 (West) (prohibiting Internet gambling). See 
also Julia Kollewe, Former Gambling Chief Dicks Is Freed in US, Independent (Sept 30, 2006), 
online at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/former-gambling-chief-dicks-is-freed-
in-us-418184.html (visited May 1, 2010) (noting that the governor of New York refused to sign an 
order to extradite an alleged Internet gambler to Louisiana).  
 103 Iowa Code Ann § 728.5 (West). 
 104 See Nunez v Holder, 594 F3d 1124, 1144–45 (9th Cir 2010) (Bybee dissenting) (discuss-
ing the application of Cal Penal Code § 314, which prohibits indecent exposure, to nude dancing 
at clubs). 
 105 Compare Cal Penal Code § 152.3 (West) (imposing the duty to report only in certain situa-
tions involving children) with 12 Vt Stat Ann § 519(a) (Equity) (mandating that a person who 
knows that another person is “exposed to grave physical harm” must, under certain circumstances, 
“give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided 
by others”). Minnesota also has a statutory duty to assist. Minn Stat Ann § 604A.01 (West). 
Act Incidence
Sodomy
97
 80,000,000/yr
Abortion
98
 1,000,000/yr
Internet pornography
99
 21,000,000/mo
Gambling
100
 >60% adults/yr
Nude performances Unknown
Failure to assist in an emergency Unknown
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article arguing that there was broad agreement on intuitions regarding 
wrongdoing, summarized in Table 5 below.
106
 They found, for example, 
that a third of participants thought that smoking marijuana should 
bring no penalty at all. A similarly large percentage of the population 
felt the same way about prostitution. And while many of the acts that 
Robinson and Kurzban included are less controversial (most would 
agree that an abortion in the seventh month is wrong, but what about 
in the third or fourth month?), they provide enough evidence of pub-
lic dissensus on these issues to make one wonder how they can be so 
confident in their claims that our understandings of wrong acts are so 
broadly shared and deeply nuanced. 
TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF RANKINGS OF CONTROVERSIAL ACTS 
SHOWING SIGNIFICANT DISAGREEMENT OVER RELATIVE 
WRONGFULNESS.
107
 
Scenario 
Mean 
Rank 
Modal 
Rank 
Percent Assigning  
“No Liability” 
Marijuana 2.2 † 33 
Prostitution 2.4 † 30 
Cocaine 4.0 † 19 
Bestiality 4.2 † 16 
Teen alcohol 4.8 5 6 
Drunk crash 6.2 6 0 
Third theft 7.1 7 0 
Late abortion 7.5 12 11 
Cocaine dealer 7.9 9 6 
Unwanted sex 8.7 11 1 
Cocaine 
importer 
8.9 10 6 
Rape 11.1 12 0 
N = 246 [VERIFY]    
† These scenarios had a modal rank of “no punishment.” 
B. Core Meltdown 
How do naturalists explain this disagreement? These controver-
sial acts, they argue, should not be evaluated alongside the others be-
cause they are outside of the “core” of wrongdoing: “physical aggres-
sion, takings without consent, and deception in exchanges.” On this 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1883 (cited in note 13) (“[T]here are punish-
ment-assignment issues on which people do indeed disagree.”). 
 107 Id at 1888 table 8. 
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account, there are some acts that are so important to our individual 
and collective welfare that we have evolved a shared intuition that 
they are wrong; others are less important, so there is more room for 
diverse intuitions.  
One reason to be unsatisfied with the core–periphery distinction is 
that it fails to tell us what, exactly, distinguishes the important core from 
the unimportant periphery of crimes. Are we agreed that controversial 
acts (incest, abortion, prostitution, mistakes about sexual consent, fail-
ing to help a child in need, drug use, whippings, cannibalism, just to 
name a few) are unimportant? Sexual misconduct, for example, might 
reasonably be included in the “core” on evolutionary grounds, as sexual 
activity (so far as we can tell, anyway) is central to continued survival; 
and yet there is dramatic cross-cultural disagreement over the enforce-
ment of sexual mores and the punishment of sexual misconduct.  
Many of the cross-cultural ranking studies that naturalists cite ac-
tually support the conclusion that there is no reliable core–periphery 
or moral–conventional distinction. Consider, for example, the rankings 
reported by Evans and Scott in their cross-cultural comparison of 
crime seriousness among US and Kuwaiti students, excerpts of which 
are reported in Table 6 below.  
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TABLE 6. A COMPARISON OF SELECTED RANKINGS OF CRIME 
SERIOUSNESS BY KUWAITI AND US CITIZENS108 
 
Description of Act 
Kuwaiti
Ranking 
US 
Ranking Difference 
A married woman committed adultery  1 32 31 
A married man committed adultery  5 31 26 
A man killed his wife during an argument 6 1 5 
A woman engaged in prostitution  7 29 22 
A man stabbed his wife with a knife during 
an argument  
8 3 5 
A male engaged in homosexuality  9 34 25 
An individual abandoned religion and es-
poused atheism 
13 36 23 
An individual threw burning liquid in 
someone’s face, which caused scars 
15 10 5 
An individual accused a woman of adultery 
without adequate proof 
17 30 13 
A single man committed fornication  18 37 19 
A woman had an illegal abortion  22 35 13 
An individual intending only to injure 
someone by throwing a stone accidental-
ly killed him 
25 6 19 
 
The disagreements are stark. Notice, for example, that Kuwaitis 
rank a woman committing adultery as more serious than a man killing 
his wife, and they rank a male engaging in homosexuality as more se-
rious than an individual who throws burning liquid in someone’s face, 
causing scars. Americans, in contrast, seem relatively unconcerned 
about adultery and homosexuality, and relatively distressed about the 
killing of adulterous wives and acid attacks—although, again, there is 
significant disagreement across subcommunities in the United States 
on the former two.
109
 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Evans and Scott, 22 Criminol at 48–49 (cited in note 46). Seriousness is ranked on a scale 
from one to thirty-seven. 
 109 While Maryland, for example, has explicitly excluded spousal infidelity as “adequate 
provocation” and potential grounds for mitigation of murder to manslaughter, most states have 
not. Compare, for example, Md Crim Code Ann § 2-207(b) with Commonwealth v Schnopps, 417 
NE2d 1213, 1215–16 (Mass 1981) (holding that the killing of a spouse can be voluntary man-
slaughter when it immediately follows the victim’s oral admission of adultery).  
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C. The Morality Convention 
What of the studies distinguishing moral and conventional 
wrongdoing? A series of critiques has been leveled against the moral–
conventional studies, noting that the findings reported depend on 
carefully selecting the questions asked. As one group of researchers 
recently noted, “the range of transgressions involving harm that has 
been included in these studies is remarkably narrow,” typically involv-
ing “behaviors that would be familiar to youngsters, such as pulling 
hair or pushing someone off a swing.”
110
 This poses a problem because 
teachers across cultures discourage hitting, pulling hair, and so on, 
making it difficult to disentangle what is innate from what is learned.  
Studies that varied the cultural frame, however, generated sub-
stantially different results. Many children, for example, hold clear and 
authority-independent intuitions about the wrongness of acts that do 
not fit the pattern of moral (rather than conventional) transgressions. 
Across many countries, for example, children were found to consis-
tently rank a broad array of transgressions as serious independent of 
authority, including “privately washing the toilet bowl with the nation-
al flag,” “mixed-sex bathing,” “addressing a teacher by his first name,” 
and violating a number of religious rules.
111
  
Another set of studies has challenged the distinctness of moral 
harms. In one study of adults, for example, Daniel Kelly and his fellow 
researchers asked participants about a series of paired harms. Here 
is one:  
 (1A) Mr. Williams was an officer on a cargo ship 300 years ago. 
One night, while at sea, he found a sailor drunk at a time when 
the sailor should have been on watch. After the sailor sobered up, 
Williams punished the sailor by giving him 5 lashes with a whip. 
Is it OK for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? [Yes/No] 
On a scale from 0 (not at all bad) to 9 (very bad), how would you 
rate Mr. Williams’ behavior? [FLIP: Apostrophe placement?] 
(1B) Mr. Adams is an officer on a large modern American cargo 
ship in 2004. One night, while at sea, he finds a sailor drunk at a 
time when the sailor should have been monitoring the radar 
screen. After the sailor sobers up, Adams punishes the sailor by 
giving him 5 lashes with a whip. 
                                                                                                                           
 110 Daniel Kelly, et al, Harm, Affect, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction, 22 Mind & 
Lang 117, 121 (2007).  
 111 Id at 120. See also Nucci, Education in the Moral Domain at 52–75 (cited in note 72) 
(discussing these studies in detail). 
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Is it OK for Mr. Adams to whip the sailor? [Yes/No] 
On a scale from 0 (not at all bad) to 9 (very bad), how would you 
rate Mr. Williams’ behavior?
112
 [FLIP: Here too] 
Based on the notion that moral harms are intuitive and generalizable, 
one would expect a consistent answer to both questions. As indicated in 
Figure 1 below, however, this was not the case. Rather, most participants 
in the study indicated that it was “OK” to whip the sailor three hundred 
years ago, while only one in ten thought it was “OK” today. Participants 
also considered the two acts to be significantly different when evaluat-
ing the wrongfulness of the act (“how bad” the whipping was).  
FIGURE 1. JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE ACCEPTABILITY OF WHIPPING A 
DERELICT SAILOR
113
[Reformat, add “today”] 
 
Similar variations were observed across several other scenarios, in-
cluding the acceptability of abusing military trainees when prohibited 
and not prohibited by authority, the acceptability of eating the flesh of a 
dead person at a funeral when customary and when not customary, a 
teacher spanking students when prohibited and not prohibited, and 
practicing slavery in ancient Rome and in the United States.
114
  
The point here is not that we cannot or should not distinguish be-
tween more or less wrongful acts. Rather, it is to say that if the main 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Kelly, et al, 22 Mind & Lang at 123–24. 
 113 Id at 127–28 (cited in note 110) (presenting the results of an online survey conducted by 
the authors). The bar graph on the left shows the percent of YES responses to the binary “Is it 
OK?” question (χ2=79.01; p=0.000). The bar graph on the right represents responses to the ques-
tion: “How would you rate Mr. X’s behavior?” (t(198)=13.55; p=0.000). 
 114 See id at 126–28.  
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distinction that can be made between important and unimportant 
criminal offenses is the degree to which individuals agree on them, 
then the statement that people tend to agree about core offenses 
amounts to saying that people tend to agree about offenses about 
which they tend to agree. It is no help to say that what distinguishes 
“core” from “periphery” is the importance of the act to our collective 
survival if the only manner of discerning the importance of behavior 
to our survival is our degree of agreement about the behavior. It is, at 
its core (so to speak), a contentless distinction.  
D. Playing Fair with Fairness Games  
Similar problems have arisen with the studies of ultimatum 
games cited by Punishment Naturalists. Many anthropologists and 
economists were not satisfied with early research in the field; they 
noticed that the studies, while conducted across many countries, all 
focused on educated students in highly industrialized societies. They 
decided to take the same game further afield to see if the results in 
other cultures resembled those reported by researchers studying indi-
viduals who were well integrated into Western capitalist culture.
115
  
What they found was revealing. Although something does move 
Responders to sacrifice what they might have gained from an unfair 
offer to punish the Proposer of the unfair offer, precisely what is con-
sidered fair and unfair varies significantly.
116
 For example, in societies 
where norms regarding equal distribution are strong, the Proposer is 
far more likely to propose something close to an even split than in 
societies where egalitarian distribution is not the norm; and if the 
Proposer in an egalitarian culture offers a lopsided split benefitting 
herself, the Responder is highly likely to reject the proposal, sacrificing 
her own share to punish the Proposer.
117
 But norms regarding fair distri-
bution are far from universal; many societies demand egalitarian shar-
ing while others feature intricately delineated social hierarchies. Con-
sider Figure 2 below, which graphs the wide variation in offers made by 
people occupying the role of the Proposer across fifteen societies with 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See, for example, Alvin E. Roth, et al, Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, 
Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study, 81 Am Econ Rev 1068, 1068–69 (1991). 
See also generally Joseph Henrich, et al, Introduction and Guide to the Volume, in Joseph He-
nrich, et al, eds, Foundations of Human Sociality 1 (Oxford 2004) (describing an account of the 
origins of this research).  
 116 This does not mean that people necessarily conform their behavior to what is considered 
fair because they are intrinsically motivated to be fair. It might be the case that individuals adjust 
their behavior strategically in order not to be punished for what they believe others will perceive 
as unfair behavior.  
 117 Henrich, et al, 28 Behav & Brain Sci at 812–13 (cited in note 60).  
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differing cultural attitudes and a variety of levels of integration into 
world markets. 
FIGURE 2.  MODIFIED BOX PLOT OF ULTIMATUM GAME OFFERS 
ACROSS FIFTEEN SOCIETIES
118
 
 
One parsimonious explanation for these differences features var-
iations in social meaning. Where there is an expectation of egalitarian 
sharing, a proposal that disproportionately rewards one individual at 
the expense of another will seem untoward and worthy of punishment. 
(Why should one person expect to gain more than another from this 
arrangement?). In others, it will seem quite reasonable and sensible 
(after all, no matter what the offer, the Responder will be getting 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Joseph Henrich, et al, “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experi-
ments in 15 Small-Scale Societies *54 figure 2 (working paper), online at http://www.som.yale.edu/ 
Faculty/keith.chen/negot.%20papers/CamererEtAll_CrossCultUltimatum01.pdf (visited May 1, 
2010). For the published version of this paper, see note 60. The box gives the interquartile range for 
offers in each society. The vertical line within each box, except for the Machiguenga, is the mean 
offer, not the median as in a standard box plot. The mean offer for the Machiguenga lies outside of 
the interquartile range and is represented by the vertical line just to the right of the box. 
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something for nothing). In both cases, the sense of fairness (or lack 
thereof) and the desire to accede (or to punish) will turn on local cus-
toms that prescribe what form fairness takes.  
The Lamalera, for example, were among the most generous ulti-
matum players—with Proposers typically offering up half or more 
than half of the money.
119
 They are subsistence whale hunters who 
share their bounty communally, often dividing a single whale among a 
hundred or more individuals—many of whom help maintain the boats, 
dry and cook the meat, or conduct other important non-hunting-
related tasks in the village. Subsequent to a whale hunt, then, the doz-
en men who ventured out into the sea to catch the whale will typically 
take only a small portion of the whale they have caught for them-
selves. For the Lamalera, the most important part of their subsistence 
economy requires regular partitioning of goods in ways that might 
seem foolish to Westerners, but which make sense when considering 
the other benefits that accrue to whale hunters as a result.
120
  
The Machiguenga, by contrast, hunt and gather small amounts of 
food, largely for themselves and their immediate families. Hunters 
(typically men) eat first and typically take the most, followed by wom-
en and children who eat whatever remains.
121
 Observers speculate that 
this is because men expend a significantly larger amount of energy 
hunting and gathering than the women, but, whatever the reason, the 
practice appears to instill a very different norm regarding the fair divi-
sion of goods. The Machiguenga Proposers appear, by Western stan-
dards, exceptionally selfish, typically offering only a quarter of the 
money. Ethnographers, however, describe them as kind, decent, and 
thoughtful; they simply have, the researchers suggest, a different un-
derstanding of what fairness and generosity entail.
122
  
Among the Gnau and Au of Papua New Guinea, another set of 
norms prevails. With extensive reciprocal demands made of one anoth-
er (individuals are often expected to give away or share common pos-
sessions and goods on demand), receiving a gift is seen as incurring a 
kind of burden or debt. Because individuals are expected to reciprocate 
gift-giving or incur significant social costs, they are reluctant to accept 
offers of gifts that they feel will place a serious potential burden on 
                                                                                                                           
 119 Sixty-three percent of Proposers divided the pie equally, and most who did not offered 
more than 50 percent. Henrich, et al, 28 Behav & Brain Sci at 811 (cited in note 60). See also 
generally Michael S. Alvard and David A. Nolin, Rousseau’s Whale Hunt? Coordination among 
Big Game Hunters, 43 Curr Anthro 533 (2002). 
 120 See Alvard and Nolin, 43 Curr Anthro at 540 (cited in note 119).  
 121 See Ethan Russo, Machiguenga: Peruvian Hunter-Gatherers, 1 Wise Traditions (Summer 
2000), online at http://www.westonaprice.org/in-his-footsteps/236-machiguenga.html (visited 
Sept 21, 2010). 
 122 See Henrich, et al, 28 Behav & Brain Sci at 811–13 (cited in note 60).  
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them.
123 So while an individual may achieve social status through gener-
ous giving, others may reject gifts in order to resist indebtedness and its 
attendant lower status. Among the Gnau and Au, the Ultimatum Game 
generated an exceptionally high number of “fair” (50 percent) and “hy-
per-fair” (more than 50 percent) offers. But hyper-fair offers were often 
rejected. The suggestion by researchers is that this reflected the com-
mon aversion to accepting overly generous gifts.
124
   
Hyper-fair offers are not rejected in all societies, though. Among 
the Sukuma of southwestern Tanzania (who are not shown on the 
chart above), the most common offer was 90 percent, the mean was 
61 percent, and no offer was rejected.
125
 Moreover, participants were 
willing to accept offers of as little as 10 percent, even though no person 
actually made an offer that low. Again, the researchers explain the 
results as reflecting local norms. Sukuma socialize their children to be 
extremely generous, requiring them to give away much of their food. 
They also have strong in-group identifications and exceptionally ge-
nerous responses to poverty, which anthropologists attribute to the 
stochastic nature of their agricultural economy and the necessity of 
pooling resources to survive.
126
  
If these studies suggest variation among social groups, another set 
of studies suggests that conceptions of fairness are socially contingent 
even within Westernized societies that are well integrated into the ca-
pitalist market system.
127
 In a series of studies conducted by Swee-
Hoon Chuah, Robert Hoffman, Martin Jones, and Geoffrey Williams 
in the United Kingdom and Malaysia, what individuals thought was 
fair and the amount that individuals were willing to sacrifice to punish 
                                                                                                                           
 123 Id at 811. Those who repeatedly fail to reciprocate are shunned and disparaged. Consid-
er id at 812. 
 124 Id at 811. See also Herbert Gintis, et al, Explaining Altruistic Behavior in Humans, 24 
Evol & Hum Behav 153, 159 (2003) (“[This] reflects Melanesian culture of status-seeking 
through gift giving. Making a large gift is a bid for social dominance in everyday life in these 
societies, and rejecting the gift is a rejection of being subordinate.”). The hypothesis offered by 
Gintis and his coauthors is consistent with the extensive anthropological literature on reciprocal 
exchange in many societies, with “gifts” being thought of as conferring status on the giver and a 
burden on the recipient. See, for example, Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for 
Exchange in Archaic Societies 65 (Routledge 1990) (W.D. Halls, trans) (originally published 
1950) (“The unreciprocated gift still makes the person who has accepted it inferior, particularly 
when it has been accepted with no thought of returning it.”). 
 125 Brian Paciotti and Craig Hadley, The Ultimatum Game in Southwestern Tanzania: Ethnic 
Variation and Institutional Scope, 44 Curr Anthro 427, 429–31 (2003). 
 126 Id at 431. 
 127 See, for example, Swee-Hoon Chuah, et al, An Economic Anatomy of Culture: Attitudes 
and Behaviour in Inter- and Intra-national Ultimatum Game Experiments, 30 J Econ Psych 732, 
733 (2009); Swee-Hoon Chuah, et al, Do Cultures Clash? Evidence from Cross-National Ultima-
tum Game Experiments, 64 J Econ Behav & Org 35, 36 (2007); Roth, et al, 81 Am Econ Rev at 
1092 (cited in note 115).  
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offers they thought of as unfair varied significantly with the values 
they espoused. Individualism, desire for gender equality, and a host of 
other values related to market participation strongly influenced the 
behavior of participants, suggesting that cultural mores within each 
society were important determinants of fairness as well.
128
  
How do naturalists account for this kind of variation in fairness 
games? For the most part, they either ignore or gloss over the data. 
One strategy, employed by Hauser, is to offer a substantially dimi-
nished version of naturalism. On this “softer” naturalism account, we 
have not evolved any specific intuitions; rather, we have moral “prin-
ciples” like fairness, and culture sets the “parameters” that tell us what 
is fair and what is not. The “principles and parameters” approach to a 
universal moral grammar is employed as an analog to Chomsky’s 
“principles and parameters” approach to constructing a universal 
grammar of human language. The problem with this tack is that on 
this softer account, nature asks culture to do all the work. If fairness 
can be whatever culture supplies, then it is not clear what work the 
hypothesized moral organ is doing.  
The alternative approach (also employed by Hauser at times) is 
little better. Arguing that nature sets specific limits on our conception 
of fairness requires a specification of what those limits are. Hauser, as 
we noted above,
129
 very conveniently chooses 15 percent and 
50 percent as the lower and upper bounds—precisely the limits ob-
served in the studies he had read at the time! If that is how one de-
termines the limits set by our common moral organ, then it is certainly 
true that it will (as a matter of logic) always accurately reflect ob-
served data; but it loses any explanatory or predictive force. It also 
cordons off as “parameters” the richness of the social meanings and 
practices that give rise to norms governing fairness, sharing, reciproci-
ty, and punishment. Naturalism can tell us nothing about why we have 
different intuitions from the Quichua, or why the Quichua have dif-
ferent intuitions from the Sakuma. For that, we need a theory that 
incorporates variations in social norms.  
Our point here is not that people’s reactions are random or with-
out structure—quite the reverse. There is a deep but highly genera-
lized structure—individuals are willing to make significant sacrifices to 
punish those they believe are being unfair—but that structure relies 
upon socially constructed norms to give it content. Without recogniz-
ing the way social meaning provides for the specific articulation of 
that structure, it is impossible to give a coherent interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See Chuah, et al, 30 J Econ Psych at 742 (cited in note 127). 
 129 See note 68 and accompanying text. 
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data. As the researchers involved in conducting these cross-cultural 
studies concluded, “[f]ailure to recognize the extent of human diversi-
ty and the range of processes that have generated the human mosaic[] 
may doom large sections of social science to an empirically false and 
culturally limited construction of human nature.”
130
  
III.  REALISM VERSUS NATURALISM AND “CORE” OFFENSES 
We doubt that naturalists will discover some independent way to 
distinguish the core of harms from the periphery, moral transgressions 
from conventional, or principles from parameters. But even if there is 
some yet-to-be-discovered distinction, naturalists would still face a more 
serious problem: there is substantial disagreement about what constitutes 
wrongdoing and how serious given offenses are within the so-called 
“core” of wrongdoing. As such, the claim that core offenses are noncon-
troversial requires not only that we ignore disagreement over what con-
stitutes core and noncore offenses, but also that we ignore significant con-
troversies within the three categories of core offenses: “physical aggres-
sion, takings without consent, and deception in exchanges.”
131
  
Comparing the abilities of realist and naturalist accounts to manage 
both agreement and disagreement over the wrongfulness of physical ag-
gression, takings without consent, and deception in exchanges, however, 
requires at least a preliminary account of the realist perspective.  
A. Punishment Realism  
Punishment Realism, in our account, applies to the study of pu-
nishment the insights of classical legal realism and contemporary em-
pirical research into human judgment.
132
 Legal realism observes that 
abstract concepts, doctrines, and rules of law do not provide unique, 
determinate resolutions to most difficult cases, and that in deciding 
such cases, legal actors—consciously or not—are necessarily moved by 
extralegal influences that shape their choice of one or another of the 
various possible justifications and outcomes. For the most part, these 
extralegal influences will move legal actors to agree, but sometimes 
they will move them to disagree.  
Realists just want to know what those extralegal influences are 
and how they manifest themselves so that they can better predict legal 
outcomes and manipulate policy to enhance whatever social welfare, 
                                                                                                                           
 130 Henrich, et al, “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective at *45 (cited in note 118). 
See also Kelly, et al, 22 Mind & Lang at 117–131 (cited in note 110). 
 131 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1892 (cited in note 13).  
 132 See generally Braman and Kahan, Legal Realism as Psychological and Cultural (Not 
Political) Realism (cited in note 3). 
File: 01 Braman, Kahan, and Hoffman Created on: 10/13/2010 11:42:00 AM Last Printed: 10/27/2010 4:42:00 PM 
2010] Some Realism about Punishment Naturalism 1567 
fairness, or expressive concern they favor. As such, realists want to 
understand the cognitive biases and heuristics that move individuals 
to interpret law and facts in particular ways.
133
 But where the naturalist 
account describes highly specific moral intuitions, the realist account 
emphasizes the interplay between relatively generic cognitive me-
chanisms and varied social meanings. On the realist account, cognition 
is, to be sure, shaped by a host of demonstrable and perhaps nearly 
universal cognitive biases and heuristics, many or all of which are the 
product of evolutionary pressures or accidents. But Punishment Real-
ism, at least as we conceive of it, views these innate cognitive traits as 
interacting with and generating a variety of social meanings that ulti-
mately determine our understanding of and reaction to wrongdoing.  
Punishment Realism recognizes that intuitions about wrongdoing 
and punishment like these will often seem natural and universal even 
when they are, in fact, socially contingent. Perhaps the most obvious 
way that individuals come to see their own parochial conceptions of 
justice as natural and universal can be described in terms of explicit 
value preferences: individuals simply prefer their own value hierar-
chies over those of others.
134
 Classic cultural clashes over sodomy, 
abortion, slavery, and many other issues are often described in these 
terms: participants may recognize that the moral hierarchies of others 
vary, but they are unlikely to prize other people’s mores and commit-
ments more highly than their own; at best they may view other value 
structures as strange or foreign, at worst as false and debased. And 
while those involved in such moral disputes may understand that their 
preferred outcomes derive from their values, they will often have 
trouble articulating the source of their values. Their values will seem, 
at least to them, to be natural.
135
  
                                                                                                                           
 133 There are a number of accounts that might fit this description. For a comparison of the 
two main accounts, see Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging: What 
Difference Does It Make?, 92 Marq L Rev 413, 422 (2009). 
 134 Consider Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture 72–73 (California 1980) 
(making the analogous point that private individuals “choose not to be aware of every danger,” 
and that when choosing between risks, “subjective values must take priority”). 
 135 That our values are not universal or transcendental, but historically specific intuitions of 
our collective making, is a perspective well described by Stanley Fish: 
I intend [the title of the book Doing What Comes Naturally] to refer to the unreflective ac-
tions that follow from being embedded in a context of practice. This kind of action . . . is any-
thing but natural in the sense of proceeding independently of historical and social forma-
tions; but once those formations are in place (and they always are), what you think to do 
will not be calculated in relation to a higher law or an overarching theory but will issue 
from you as naturally as breathing. 
Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Lite-
rary and Legal Studies ix (Duke 1989). 
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But the overt privileging of one’s values over those of others of-
ten masks a subtler and even more pervasive way that individuals 
come to see their own intuitive sense of justice as natural and univer-
sal: cultural cognition. Cultural cognition refers to the tendency of in-
dividuals to conform their perceptions of risks and their factual beliefs 
to their core cultural commitments. It is cognitively easier to believe 
factual assertions that comport with our norm-pervaded moral evalua-
tions and cognitively harder to believe those that conflict with or 
threaten them.  
Numerous studies have shown that culture implicitly shapes fac-
tual perceptions in this way, shaping our beliefs without our noticing 
that it is doing so. Culture constructs our understandings of fact both 
through cognitive mechanisms (such as avoiding cognitive dissonance, 
the tendency of individuals to discount information that conflicts with 
their existing beliefs and values) and social practices (such as selecting 
information sources like favored news outlets and friends who share 
our values). Individuals with varied and durable conceptions of what 
is noble and what is base thus form equally varied and durable con-
ceptions about what is true and what is false. As a result, even where 
individuals are willing to agree to a single legal standard that requires 
specific factual findings (as jurors must), a host of cognitive biases and 
heuristics can move them to conform their understanding of relevant 
facts so that they arrive at varied appraisals of wrongfulness.  
These two forms of cultural influence—one explicit and one im-
plicit—are often mutually reinforcing. Because individuals tend to 
credit factual claims that are consistent with their normative visions of 
a just social order, when they reflect on their cultural commitments 
they have plenty of facts to suggest that their worldview is naturally 
preferable to others. And, because their cultural commitments will 
seem naturally preferable to them, they are less likely to question 
these commitments or their influence on their factual perceptions.  
We have more to say below about Punishment Realism and the 
various social and cognitive mechanisms that sustain it, but with that 
brief summary in hand, we turn to crimes within the so-called “core of 
wrongdoing.”  
B. The Core Offenses 
There are recurrent themes in the kinds of acts that are prohi-
bited in many cultures. Robinson and Kurzban have helpfully col-
lected them under the rubrics of “aggression, takings without consent, 
and deception in exchange,” and argue that acts falling into these cat-
egories constitute “the core of wrongdoing.” As we argue below, none 
of these categories is composed of acts free from dissensus, and the na-
ture of the systematic dissensus that pervades each of these categories is 
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at least as interesting and informative as any agreement that can be 
found. We start with “takings without consent” and “deception in ex-
change,” two easy cases. Then we take on rape, followed by the hardest 
case—the core of the core of wrongdoing, so to speak—murder, 
around which we develop our argument in greater detail.  
1. Takings without consent. 
The anecdote at the beginning of this Article provides some meas-
ure of the problems faced by naturalist claims about a universal or 
normal intuition regarding takings without consent. A substantial part 
of the dissensus over takings relates to varied conceptions of property. 
As the anthropologists Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Ben-
da-Beckmann, and Melanie Wiber describe, the concept of property can 
be thought of as depending on three variable concepts: “first, the social 
units (individuals, groups, lineages, corporations, states) that can hold 
property rights and obligations; second, the construction of valuables as 
property objects; and third, the different sets of rights and obligations 
social units can have with respect to such objects.”
136 
As we noted in the Introduction, even where everyone is in 
agreement on the idea that someone owns something of value—a train 
ticket, for example—that individual’s rights and obligations can vary 
dramatically from context to context. In the United States, we typical-
ly have highly individualistic conceptions of rights and obligations—at 
least relative to those living in India and Papua New Guinea. As a 
result, an act that would be considered an invasion of some property-
like right in one time or place can seem perfectly normal in another 
because the norms governing who has access to what and under which 
conditions vary so dramatically across time and place.  
The anthropological literature on non-Western cultures provides 
ample illustration of this,
137
 but we need look no further than recent 
                                                                                                                           
 136 Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, and Melanie G. Wiber, The 
Properties of Property, in Franz Benda-Beckman, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, and Melanie G. 
Wiber, eds, Changing Properties of Property 1, 15 (Berghahn 2006).  
 137 Anthropologists have come to view the notion of property as often contested:  
[P]eople have at any given moment a number of “languages” available to them for charac-
terizing objects in circulation as commodified, gift-like, inalienable, and so on. These lan-
guages are often in tension; actors also have differential access to them. And they use these 
languages within a context that may constrain the use of some idioms and support the use 
of others. This perspective . . . helps us understand how multiple or hybrid forms of value 
occur simultaneously. 
Elizabeth Emma Ferry, Not Ours Alone: Patrimony, Value, and Collectivity in Contemporary Mexico 
18 (Columbia 2005). David Graeber and Maurice Godelier provide two recent and influential 
general accounts of the way value and property vary across time and place. See generally David 
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domestic debates (over, for example, the law of taxation, in which the 
ownership of a good that is highly valued—money—is continually 
contested;
138
 or eminent domain,
139
 adverse possession, nuisance, or in-
tellectual property, on which the members of the public, the academy, 
and the bench regularly disagree) to get a flavor of the sticky dissen-
sus over “takings without consent” closer to home.
140
  
It is no help to modify the naturalist account by suggesting that, al-
though the idea of property varies, the notion does not vary that trans-
gressions of those rights are intuitively wrong. Without providing con-
tent to the rights themselves, this simply passes along the cognitive puz-
zle of what is wrongful to local norms governing what exactly it is that 
comprises a property right. This is not to say that there may not be some 
very general traits that humans share with respect to affection for vari-
ous possessions.
141
 The question is whether we have universal intuitions 
about when an act is theft and, if so, how wrongful it is relative to other 
acts. And that is something that simply cannot be resolved without ref-
erence to variable social norms.  
This is a modified version of Jerry Fodor’s “input problem” for 
evolutionary theories that rely on multiple cognitive modules of this 
sort.
142
 If the argument is that we have a module that helps us quickly 
compute a judgment such as “theft is wrong,” we need to have some 
sense of when something qualifies as theft. But the definition of theft 
(or fraud or murder) is fairly complex and socially contingent in evo-
lutionary contexts, depending on social groups, status, and a host of 
other concerns. Because you need complex social information to as-
sess whether something is theft, you have not really bought any cogni-
tive efficiency with a module that tells you that theft is wrong, because 
                                                                                                                           
Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams (Pal-
grave 2001); Maurice Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift (Chicago 1999) (Nora Scott, trans).  
 138 Compare, for example, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership 8 
(Oxford 2002) (arguing that private property is a legal convention defined in part by the tax 
system) with Stephen Moore, In Their Own Words, Natl Rev Online (Apr 23, 2002), online at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/moore/moore042302.asp (visited May 1, 2010) (critiquing Mur-
phy and Nagel’s book). 
 139 As Janice Nadler and Shari Diamond have found in their research, variable concepts 
like “subjective attachment to property” are paramount in shaping “the perceived justice of a 
taking.” Janice Nadler and Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of 
Property Rights, Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J Empirical Legal 
Stud 713, 713 (2009). See also, for example, Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469 (2005), 
which provoked public debate over property rights and takings without consent. 
 140 Special thanks to Stephanie Stern for making this point to us.  
 141 See, for example, Richard C. Stedman, Toward a Social Psychology of Place, 34 Envir & 
Behav 561, 563 (2002).  
 142 See Jerry Fodor, The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way 71–78 (MIT 2000) (describing the 
input problem).  
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the same complex social information that tells you that something is 
theft can also tell you that it is wrong and how wrong it is.  
It is, of course, possible to move away from specifics and develop 
general rules on which people agree. But such definitions invariably 
depend on some variable notion of what makes something wrongful. 
Taking without consent and deception in exchange are thus not always 
wrong; rather, they are wrong when social customs tell us so.  
2. Deception in exchange. 
If ever there was a messy and discordant conception in law and 
morality, it is that governing “deception in exchange.” Punishment 
Naturalists assert that deception in exchange is one of the core areas 
of agreement in our moral development. They suggest that the moral 
norm against deception arises because of the “analogical closeness to 
inflicting direct personal harm on another” or because it is an “ex-
tremely useful mechanism for a society to develop”:
143
 intuitions like 
these enable cooperation because they punish defectors and cheats.
144
 
We agree that across societies, individuals exhibit a general (and 
widely shared) dislike of shirking and fraud. The positive version of 
this dislike is instantiated in the norm of reciprocity.
145
 But that general 
principle falls apart at the level of specificity at which the law typically 
operates. Individuals, it turns out, have quite divergent views about 
whether specific kinds of lying are wrongful, and how far the law 
ought to go to protect buyers in commercial exchanges from their own 
bad judgment in relying on a seller’s speech. Because these are the 
live issues in the criminal regulation of deception, we briefly explore 
such divergent views here. 
Consider first the definitional problem. For example, judges com-
monly take from the jury actions for civil or criminal fraud in sale of 
goods cases where the seller has “puffed” her goods.
146
 This alone sug-
gests that the general principle “do not lie in commercial exchange” has 
                                                                                                                           
 143 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 58–59 (cited in note 15). 
 144 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1647–49 (cited in note 14). 
 145 See generally Kathleen Vohs, Roy Baumeister, and Jason Chin, Feeling Duped: Emo-
tional, Motivational, and Cognitive Aspects of Being Exploited by Others, 11 Rev Gen Psych 127 
(2007); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 Mich L 
Rev 71 (2003). 
 146 Many of the issues in puffery, such as questions of falsifiability in false advertising cases, 
are often resolved as matters of law rather than fact. See Jean W. Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: 
False Advertising under the Lanham Act, 79 BU L Rev 807, 867–71 (1999); Ivan L. Preston, The 
Definition of Deceptiveness in Advertising and Other Commercial Speech, 39 Cath U L Rev 1035, 
1040–41 (1990). 
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a variety of concrete meanings.
147
 The Supreme Court itself has ad-
vanced distinct—and often competing—definitions of what the term 
“misleading” means.
148
 Both jurists and lay people simply do not have 
stable preferences about what constitutes “deception.” Instead, their 
views about whether speech in fact deceives turn on their implicit 
views of whether it should.  
One might be tempted to believe that these various rules on the 
meaning of deception turn on a general empirical finding that individ-
uals do not believe sales talk. But, as a number of studies have found, 
“puffery is believed by large numbers of consumers,”
149
 though not 
all.
150
 In this way, the law of fraud is full of conflicts over values—do we 
want individuals to bear the responsibility for their own choices, or do 
we want individuals to recognize context and market power as impor-
tant—masquerading as disputes about fact. That dissensus in turn 
produces the hotly disputed political fights regarding the law of de-
ception in exchange we see all around us, including the scope of the 
securities laws and the appropriateness of most forms of consumer 
protection regulation.  
                                                                                                                           
 147 See David Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 Iowa L Rev 1395, 1400–16 (2006) 
(defining the puffery defense in false advertising, securities, UCC warranty, and promissory 
estoppel cases). See also Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other “Loophole” Claims: How the Law’s 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity in Advertising, 18 J L & Commerce 
49, 54–55 (1998) (noting that puffery may take a variety of forms, including claims that a product 
is the “best,” “best possible,” “better,” and “specially good”). Hoffman provides a host of in-
stances where intuitions vary on seemingly similar cases:  
Advil’s claim that it, “like Tylenol,” “doesn’t upset the stomach” was found not to be immune 
puffery because a court believed that consumers would have viewed the statements to be a 
factual comparison with other brands. Similarly, a motor-oil company’s claim to provide “long-
er engine life and better engine protection” was not held to be puffery. By contrast, a puffery 
defense succeeded with respect to Bayer’s statement that it made the “the world’s best aspi-
rin” that “works wonders.” And a videogame manufacturer escaped liability, despite claiming 
to have made “The Most Advanced Home Gaming System in the Universe.” . . . 
The claim that yogurt is “nature’s perfect food” apparently may be falsified and is not puffery. 
But, to enthusiasts’ chagrin, Nestlé’s boast that it sells the “very best chocolate” is a meaning-
less puff. If, upon eating too much chocolate yogurt, one needed a diet, the makers of topical 
gel could be liable for claiming to “dramatically interfere with the process of converting calo-
ries to fat” and “inhibit the creation of new fat cells.” But, the makers of a weight-loss pill 
trumpeting the drug’s ability to cause you to “Lose Weight Fast” would be protected. 
Hoffman, 91 Iowa L Rev at 1404 (cited in note 147) (alterations omitted). 
 148 See generally Hoffman, 91 Iowa L Rev 1395 (cited in note 147), Robert Post, The Con-
stitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L Rev 1 (2000). 
 149 Perry Haan and Cal Berkey, A Study of the Believability of the Forms of Puffery, 8 J 
Marketing Comm 243, 246 (2002) (citing studies). 
 150 See Hoffman, 91 Iowa L Rev at 1442 (cited in note 147). 
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Thus, while it may be “intuitively easy to make the connection be-
tween physically taking property and physically harming another,”
151
 
the category of “deception in exchange” lacks legal coherence. Rather, 
some kinds of deception, in certain circumstances, are actionable and 
morally wrongful. Sometimes, violators of the “norm” of reciprocity 
are held to be legally responsible by most of the population, some-
times by only part of the population, and sometimes by only a small 
minority.
152
 The contingency of the finding turns on individuals’ views 
of what we owe to one another as citizens, the degree to which indi-
viduals should be responsible for their own flourishing or should turn 
to social systems for protection, and the amount of freedom we ought 
to permit speakers to falsely extol or mislead by omission.  
3. Rape. 
The law of rape has been a site of intense legal and political con-
flict for over thirty years, and “date” or “acquaintance rape” has been 
at the center of that dispute.
153
 In particular, those involved in the de-
bate disagree over how the law should deal with cases in which a 
woman engages in “verbal resistance”—that is, says “no”—but does 
not display the form or quantum of “physical resistance” demanded 
by the traditional, common law definition of rape.
154
 Arguing that the 
law’s resistance to convicting in such cases leaves women unprotected 
from one especially common form of coerced sex, feminist and other 
reformers have successfully attained a variety of reforms. All jurisdic-
tions have now adopted evidentiary rules that prohibit proof of a 
complainant’s “sexual history” designed to show a propensity to con-
sent.
155
 Some, but not others, have modified elements of the traditional 
common law definition of rape, such as elimination of the “force or 
threat of force” element or the reasonable mistake of fact defense 
                                                                                                                           
 151 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 58–59 (cited in note 15) (arguing for the “ana-
logical closeness” of these categories). 
 152 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Efficient Breach: A Psy-
chological Experiment, 108 Mich L Rev 633, 654–64 (2010) (demonstrating that individuals’ 
feelings of moral loss associated with contractual breach can be ameliorated by private law side 
agreements). See also Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 
Vand L Rev 1003, 1022–33 (2010) (demonstrating that individuals’ perceptions of loss of status 
due to breaches of reciprocity could be manipulated in various contractual scenarios). 
 153 See generally Susan Caringella, Addressing Rape Reform in Law and Practice 12–17 
(Columbia 2009); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the 
Failure of Law 29–46 (Harvard 1998).  
 154 Compare, for example, Estrich, Real Rape at 102–03 (cited in note 9) (arguing for a “no 
means no” standard in the law) with D.N. Husak and G.C. Thomas, Date Rape, Social Convention, 
and Reasonable Mistakes, 11 L & Phil 95, 122–25 (1992) (arguing against a standard that treats a 
verbal “no” as sufficient). 
 155 See, for example, FRE 412. 
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relating to consent, aimed at forcing judges and jurors to treat “no” as 
“no” for purposes of rape law.
156
 These reforms, however, seem to have 
had little impact in practice
157
 and continue to generate scholarly and 
political debate.
158
  
Punishment Naturalists have voiced skepticism, if not hostility, 
toward such reform efforts. They identify the imposition of “[s]trict 
liability in cases where culpability may be difficult to prove, but is like-
ly to exist” as an ill-considered departure from what are asserted to be 
shared intuitions.
159
 Among “the reform programs” that they identify 
as involving “criminal law manipulation . . . to alter people’s intuitions 
of justice” is the “attempt[] to eradicate the notion that women often 
pretend to withhold consent to intercourse to appear more alluring or 
simply to avoid appearing ‘promiscuous,’ rather than as a genuine in-
dication of not wanting to engage in sexual activity.”
160
 But nothing in 
their carefully conducted empirical studies of shared intuitions in fact 
supports the sort of conservative stance toward reform efforts that 
these comments imply.  
The Punishment Naturalists conclude that rape is among the 
“core” forms of “wrongdoing” that are “the subject of nuanced and spe-
cific intuitions that cut across demographics.”
161
 The evidence consists of 
multiple studies showing that demographically diverse individuals are 
highly likely to agree that “rape” should be punished and is a more “se-
rious” form of wrongdoing than various other offenses.
162
 The Punish-
ment Naturalists have themselves found that subjects tend to regard 
“rape” as more serious than imposition of mere “unwanted sex.”
163
 
It is simply not possible to derive from this evidence any reason 
to be skeptical, much less any reason to oppose, date-rape reform ef-
forts. There might well be “consensus” that rape should be punished 
and is “worse” than inducing another to engage in “unwanted sex.” 
But there most manifestly is not consensus in American society on 
how “rape” should be defined, and in particular whether a man who 
engages in sex with a woman who repeatedly tells him “no” before 
and during intercourse has committed “rape” or merely succeeded in 
achieving “unwanted sex,” or over how severely, if at all, to punish 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See, for example, Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex at 30–33 (cited in note 153). 
 157 See generally Jody Clay-Warner and Callie Harbin Burt, Rape Reporting after Reforms: 
Have Times Really Changed?, 11 Violence Against Women 150 (2005). 
 158 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and 
Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U Pa L Rev 729 (2010). 
 159 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 46–47 (cited in note 15). 
 160 Id at 52. 
 161 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1892 (cited in note 13). 
 162 See id at 1853 & n 100, 1856 & n 123, 1859 & nn 135, 138.  
 163 See id at 1885–88. 
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such a man. Indeed, the Punishment Naturalists themselves have re-
ported finding less consensus surrounding whether and how much to 
punish “unwanted sex,” presumably because people do disagree about 
whether it should be regarded as a crime, and, if so, as serious a crime 
as rape.
164
  
The source of that disagreement is cultural. Psychologists and so-
ciologists specializing in women’s studies have shown that disagree-
ments over a host of beliefs and attitudes toward rape correlate with 
competing sets of moral norms—one that is “hierarchical” in nature 
and prescribes highly stratified gender roles, and another that is more 
“egalitarian” and rejects the proposition of separate male and female 
spheres in society.
165
 A recent mock-juror study conducted by the Cul-
tural Cognition Project at Yale Law School found that the outlooks 
individuals subscribed to predicted high levels of disagreement over 
whether a man should be found guilty of rape in a case patterned on 
Commonwealth v Berkowitz,
166
 a “no means yes” acquaintance rape 
case that provoked intense political controversy in the 1990s and that 
continues to be featured in scholarly commentary. The disagreement 
among ordinary citizens over such cases can be linked to a form of 
cultural status competition insofar as both hierarchical and egalitarian 
individuals perceive that the stance the law adopts on this issue will 
align it with the norms of one or the other cultural group. Indeed, the 
group most resistant to and resentful of reform of the common law of 
rape, the study found, consisted of hierarchical women (particularly 
older ones), whose high social status is most conspicuously tied to con-
tinued public endorsement of the traditional, but not bitterly con-
tested, norms of sexuality.
167
  
This controversy is fraught with difficult issues. Should the law 
weigh in on the side of those who want to make “no” mean “no” for 
purposes of rape law as a means of promoting egalitarian norms? Or 
would that be an inappropriately partisan and illiberal application of 
law to promote a moral and cultural orthodoxy? Alternatively, if the 
law resists demands for change, is it not siding with the hierarchical po-
sition, effectively endorsing that position’s understanding of idealized 
gender norms? If the law is to be made to take a side in this debate, how 
can it do so effectively? If it wants to be genuinely neutral, what stance 
would effectively communicate that intention? These questions cannot 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See id at 1890–91 & n 230. 
 165 See, for example, Michael W. Wiederman, The Gendered Nature of Sexual Scripts, 13 Fam 
J 496, 499 (2005); Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J Personality & Soc 
Psych 217, 225 (1980). 
 166 641 A2d 1161 (Pa 1994). 
 167 See Kahan, 158 U Pa L Rev at 734 (cited in note 158). 
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even be framed intelligibly, much less answered satisfactorily, by any 
theoretical framework of criminal law that insists on confining its atten-
tion to issues on which there is “consensus”—issues that are peripheral 
to urgent, pressing debate whether or not they might be said to be at 
the “core” of a set of “shared intuitions.”  
Indeed, a framework that fails to acknowledge or recognize that 
it is addressing issues at the practical and political periphery of crimi-
nal law can easily generate unreliable explanations and prescriptions. 
One Punishment Naturalist, Owen Jones, posits (on the basis of extra-
polation from sociobiological theory) differences in “male and female 
brains” that cause them to “process rape victimization differently,” 
with the latter predisposed to take it much more seriously because of 
the impact it had in disrupting “female mate choice in ancestral envi-
ronments.”
168
 Jones surmises (on the basis of further conjecture) that 
these ingrained biological differences are the likely source of the inef-
ficacy of rape law reforms and identifies (without necessarily endors-
ing) various reforms aimed at making the biological foundations for 
male–female disagreements manifest, thus promoting greater resolve 
on the part of the legal system to convict rapists and punish them 
more severely.
169
  
As fascinating and insightful as it is, this account will not be of 
much use to anyone earnestly engaged in trying to understand and 
promote morally appropriate solutions to the existing debate over 
rape law reform. The one feature of this account that admits of empir-
ical examination—its assertion that the inefficacy of rape-reform laws 
stems from male and female differences over the seriousness of rape 
victimization—is contrary to all the available evidence. Indeed, with-
out (as far as we know) following any of Jones’s strategies for remedy-
ing a deficiency in how seriously men take the harm of rape, the law 
has made progress in reducing the incidence of violent stranger rape 
comparable in degree to the progress it has made in reducing many 
other forms of common crimes, including homicide, in recent dec-
ades.
170
 The form of rape that apparently has evaded reduction is exact-
ly the type—date or acquaintance rape—at which the “no means no” 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and 
Prevention, 87 Cal L Rev 827, 917 (1999). 
 169 See id at 917–20. 
 170 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Key Facts at a Glance: National Crime Victimization 
Survey Violent Crime Trends, 1973–2008, online at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/ 
viortrdtab.cfm (visited Oct 22, 2010) (reporting a drop in the incidence of rape from 2.8 per 1,000 
to 0.4 per 1,000 between 1979 and 2004).  
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reforms have been directed.
171
 As explained, the force that has limited 
those reforms is not biological but cultural. The conflict here is not 
one originating (in brains, genes, or anything else) between men and 
women; it is between men and women of one cultural outlook and 
men and women of another. Indeed, the group with the narrowest ap-
prehension of what “rape” is—the one most likely to see “no” as 
meaning “yes”—consists of hierarchical women. What reason is there 
for supposing that “contextualizing women’s emotional reactions to 
rape within the evolutionary processes”
172
 would help make them more 
likely as citizens to support rape law reform or to vote as jurors to 
convict under reform statutes once they are enacted?  
Indeed, far from helping to advance the cause of those who want 
to reduce the incidence of acquaintance rape, Jones’s attempt to derive 
guidance from the (conjectured) sociobiological differences in men’s 
and women’s apprehensions of the harm of rape are more likely to ob-
struct it. Jones, for example, argues against the enactment of “sexual 
assault” statutes, apparently unaware of the role that such statutes are 
intended to play in norm reform: calling nonconsensual sex that is un-
accompanied by force or threat of force “sexual assault” is less likely to 
trigger resistance to punishing forms of “unwanted sex” that some men 
and women condemn but do not regard as “rape”; and by assuring at 
least some degree of punishment for such behavior now, such statutes 
make it more likely that in the future more men and women will join 
the ranks of those who already regard such behavior as “rape” and who 
see it as meriting designation and punishment as such.
173
 How successful 
this strategy has been, and whether it is otherwise morally appropriate, 
are matters of reasonable debate.
174
 But the only arguments that will 
contribute meaningfully to that discussion are the ones that come to 
grips, in an empirically informed way, with the real cultural differences 
in individuals’ understandings of what “rape” is. 
Perhaps naturalists’ conceptions of takings without consent, de-
ception in exchange, and rape are complicated in these ways because 
these offenses less central to the naturalist conception of “the core of 
wrongdoing” than offenses involving the most serious form of physical 
aggression: killing. In what follows, we focus on the most serious of 
                                                                                                                           
 171 Clay-Warner and Burt, 11 Violence Against Women at 167 (cited in note 157) (conclud-
ing that the incidence of reporting of “simple” or acquaintance rape, as opposed to “aggravated” 
or stranger rape, has not changed since the 1970s). 
 172 See Jones, 87 Cal L Rev at 918 (cited in note 168). 
 173 See Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex at 104–05 (cited in note 153); Kahan, 158 U Pa L Rev at 
752 (cited in note 158). 
 174 See Kahan, 158 U Pa L Rev at 752–53 (cited in note 158). 
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wrongdoings in this class, murder. If naturalism is to prevail anywhere, 
surely it should be with the most serious crimes in our legal repertoire.175  
4. Murder. 
Punishment Naturalism holds that people agree both on what 
constitutes murder and on how serious a given murder is relative to 
other potentially bad acts. Punishment Realism, in contrast, holds that 
while people agree on many cases (for example, the heinous kidnap-
ping-torture-murder case described above
176
), they also frequently dis-
agree about both whether an act is so wrong as to be criminal and, if it 
is, how serious the criminal offense is.  
a) Ambiguous agreement.  Take, as an example, Robinson and 
Kurzban’s study showing that people generally agree that the killer in 
the first of the following vignettes is guilty and should be punished 
while the killer in the second is innocent and should not: 
SCENARIO A: John knows the address of a woman who has high-
ly offended him. As he had planned the day before, he waits 
there for the woman to return from work and, when she appears, 
John shoots her to death.
177
 
SCENARIO B: John is knocked down from behind by a man with a 
knife who moves to stab him. As the man lunges for him, John 
stabs him with a piece of glass he finds on the ground, which is 
the only thing he can do to save himself from being killed. The 
man later dies of his injuries.
178 
We do not doubt that there is little disagreement over either claim 
in cases like these in the contemporary United States. Most people will 
define the former as a crime and the latter as not a crime; and even 
where they do believe the latter to be a crime, they consistently rank it 
as less serious than the former. But what underlies this consistency?  
Naturalism and realism both furnish explanations for this agree-
ment. The naturalist explanation features evolutionary pressures: if we 
did not agree on the wrongfulness of taking human life, our existence 
would be—at least relatively speaking—nasty, brutish, and short. Col-
lectively, then, humans who intuitively viewed this kind of aggression 
as wrong and deserving of punishment were more likely to survive as 
a group; those who did not were less likely to survive. The result was a 
                                                                                                                           
 175 Naturalists themselves agree with this prioritization of violence over other wrongs. See, 
for example, Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1635 n 5 (cited in note 14). 
 176 See text accompanying note 36. 
 177 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1897 (cited in note 13).  
 178 Id at 1894. 
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gradual growth of human sociality;
179
 but this sociality should be 
thought of not as an agreement or an implicit norm to which people 
are acculturated, but as a modest but ever increasing biological dispo-
sition to view these acts as wrong and deserving punishment.  
Realism, by contrast, explains this agreement as the product of 
shared social meaning, an agreement deriving from cultural norms 
that are widely shared in our society. While both scenarios are quite 
vague, they provide enough for readers to form a picture of the defen-
dant in each case and to evaluate, relative to socially constructed 
norms, the moral quality of each act. On this account, the impulse to 
view the first act as wrong and the second as innocent stems not from 
an innate moral organ, but rather from shared socialization. This does 
not mean that there are not innate cognitive mechanisms at work, but 
rather that they are quite general and allow for the construction of 
social meanings that may vary substantially. Nor does it mean that 
humans will necessarily disagree: if they are similarly socialized, then 
they will in all probability evaluate the social meaning of these acts in 
similar ways.  
Both accounts fully explain the lack of variation found by Robin-
son and Kurzban on this item. And, if humans always agreed on what 
distinguishes a good from a bad killing, it would be impossible to fig-
ure out which of the two accounts furnishes a better explanation of 
the available data. To distinguish between the two accounts, then, we 
have to alter the scenarios such that the social meaning of an act is in 
dispute. We could then see if variations in cultural outlooks explained 
variations in appraisals of guilt.  
In what follows, we do that. We look first at examples in which 
there are explicit disagreements over which standards should govern 
what constitutes a serious wrong. We then look at instances in which, 
even where individuals accept a single standard, they disagree over 
which acts meet the standard.  
b) Disagreement over standards.  One way to evaluate these two 
accounts is to ask whether there have been cultural regimes in which 
the meaning of these acts varied. History, as it happens, furnishes 
many such examples; we describe just a few.
180 
While the contemporary formulation of self-defense doctrine ad-
dresses persons in universal terms, supplying a unitary standard that 
makes no reference to the social identities of the persons entitled to use 
                                                                                                                           
 179 See Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1646–54 (cited in note 14) (arguing 
that human social impulses laid the foundation for a predisposition to acquire shared intuitions 
of justice, which provided evolutionary benefits to the individuals bearing them).  
 180 These are drawn from Kahan and Braman, 45 Am Crim L Rev at 3 n 2 (cited in note 34). 
File: 01 Braman, Kahan, and Hoffman Created on:  10/13/2010 11:42:00 AM Last Printed: 10/27/2010 4:42:00 PM 
1580 The University of Chicago Law Review [77:1531 
deadly force or those against whom they are entitled to use it,
181
 this was 
not always the case. Historically, many societies conditioned the use of 
deadly force in self-defense on membership in a privileged class.
182
  
One need not leave the United States to find such contentious 
social meanings: the law in the antebellum American South also made 
such distinctions, denying blacks the authority to use deadly force to 
protect themselves from deadly assaults by whites and affording 
whites greater authority to use deadly force against blacks than 
against fellow whites.
183
 As Justice William Brennan noted in his fam-
ous dissent in McCleskey v Kemp,
184
 during the colonial period, “black 
slaves who killed whites in Georgia, regardless of whether in self-
defense or in defense of another, were automatically executed,” but “a 
person who willfully murdered a slave was not punished until the 
second offense, and then was responsible simply for restitution to the 
slave owner.”
185
  
What would members of that historical moment have made of the 
following vignettes? 
MODIFIED SCENARIO A: John owns a slave who has highly of-
fended him. As he had planned the day before, he waits for his 
slave to return from work and, when he appears, John shoots him 
to death. 
MODIFIED SCENARIO B: Joe, a slave, is knocked down from be-
hind by his owner, John, who moves to stab him. As John lunges 
for him, Joe stabs him with a piece of glass he finds on the 
                                                                                                                           
 181 The traditional standard is couched in terms that are reflected in nearly every jurisdic-
tion in the United States today: a person who has not otherwise provoked aggression is entitled 
to resort to deadly force against another (and hence is protected from criminal liability for doing 
so) when she honestly and reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent an im-
minent threat of death or great bodily harm to herself. See Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Substantive Crim-
inal Law § 10.4(b) (West 2d ed 2003).[FLIP: PAGE #?] If the threat is of some lesser magnitude, 
a person may repel it only with nonlethal force. See id.  
 182 See generally David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant, and Joanne D. Eisen, The Human Right of 
Self-Defense, 22 BYU J Pub L 43, 104–13 (2008) (describing which classes were able to use self-
defense under Greek, Jewish, and Roman law). 
 183 See, for example, A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr and Anne F. Jacobs, The “Law Only as an 
Enemy”: The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness through the Colonial and Antebellum Crim-
inal Laws of Virginia, 70 NC L Rev 969, 1042 (1992):  
Despite the unrelenting punishments and beatings that a slave might receive at the hands of 
an overseer, an owner, or another white, there were only rare instances in which a slave 
might claim self-defense in the killing of a white person. Such cases generally involved 
whites of low socioeconomic background. 
 184 481 US 279 (1987).  
 185 Id at 329 & n 8 (Brennan dissenting), citing A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr, In the Matter of 
Color: Race in the American Legal Process: The Colonial Period 253, 254 & n 90, 256 (Oxford 1978).  
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ground, which is the only thing he can do to save himself from 
being killed. John later dies of his injuries. 
While it would be hard for naturalists to account for the distinctive 
understandings of these vignettes in colonial and contemporary 
American communities, realism offers a straightforward explanation 
for the observed variation. A realist account would describe the 
changing importance of social status within colonial and contempo-
rary American society and the various rights and duties (or lack the-
reof) that accompanied status. Within a society that embraces such 
status distinctions, the social meaning of aggression by someone of 
stature and rank against a subaltern was distinct from the meaning of 
aggression by the subaltern against a person of status.
186
  
Again, even if we limit our scope to the United States, it is well 
known that tolerance of the use of deadly force to protect various 
nonvital interests has varied significantly across time and place. Marks 
of social status, such as displays of deference in public space and male 
dominion over the sexual lives of wives and daughters in particular, 
are a conspicuous characteristic of communities guided by honor 
norms.
187
 For example, in many Southern jurisdictions in the United 
States, it was once the case that the paramour could not “lawfully de-
fend himself against the husband’s violence, and stand his ground and 
shoot or cut in order to repel the husband’s attack upon him.”
188
 Again, 
we can modify the vignettes slightly to alter their social meaning in 
this historical context:  
MODIFIED SCENARIO A: John knows the address of a man, Tom, 
who has offended him by implying he had sex with his wife. As he 
had planned the day before, he waits there for Tom to return 
from work and, when he appears, John confronts him and shoots 
him to death. 
                                                                                                                           
 186 Similar status hierarchies can be found in many societies. Consider, for example, the Toku-
gawa administrative code in feudal Japan that granted Samurai the privilege of “kiri-sute-gomen, 
that is the privilege of a samurai to cut down a commoner with impunity.” E. Herbert Norman, 
Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period 18 (In-
stitute of Pacific Relations 1940). See also David B. Kopel, The Samurai, the Mountie, and the Cow-
boy: Should America Adopt the Gun Controls of Other Democracies? 30 (Prometheus 1992) (“Any 
disrespectful member of the lower class could be executed by a Samurai’s sword.”). 
 187 See Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in 
the South 32 (Westview 1996) (arguing that the culture of the South included a tolerance for the use 
of violence for the protection of vital as well as what would now be considered nonvital interests).  
 188 William M. McKinney and Burdett A. Rich, eds, 13 Ruling Case Law 834 (Thompson 
1916), citing Dabney v State, 21 So 211, 211–12 (Ala 1897); Drysdale v State, 10 SE 358, 358 
(Ga 1889). 
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MODIFIED SCENARIO B: After implying he had sex with John’s 
wife, Tom is knocked down from behind by John who moves to 
stab him with a knife. As John lunges for him, Tom stabs him with 
a piece of glass he finds on the floor, which is the only thing he can 
do to save himself from being killed. John later dies of his injuries. 
In considering how varied the evaluations of these vignettes might be, 
consider the experiments conducted by Richard Nisbett and Dov Co-
hen discussing honor norms that govern interactions like these in the 
contemporary United States.
189
  
In one particularly revealing study, Nisbett and Cohen told partic-
ipants about a man named Fred and asked how justified Fred would 
be in fighting an acquaintance who had affronted him in some way. 
The first set of questions asked respondents how justified physical 
aggression would be if it were in response to another man who “looks 
over Fred’s girlfriend and starts talking to her in a suggestive way,” 
“insults Fred’s wife, implying that she has loose morals,” or “tells oth-
ers behind Fred’s back that Fred is a liar and a cheat.” In a second set 
of questions, they asked whether Fred would be justified in shooting 
the person who had committed certain “more serious affronts.”
190
  
A summary of the results are provided below in Figure 3. Across 
all the questions, Southerners were more likely to suggest that a vio-
lent response was “extremely justified” and that Fred would not be 
“much of a man” if he did not respond violently.
191
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 189 Nisbett and Cohen, Culture of Honor at 31 (cited in note 187).  
 190 Id.  
 191 Id.  
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FIGURE 3.  PERCENTAGE OF SOUTHERNERS AND MIDWESTERNERS 
APPROVING OF A VIOLENT RESPONSE TO VARIOUS SCENARIOS
192
 
 
 
Nisbett and Cohen reason that the regional variation they see in 
the responses reflects differences in local norms regarding what con-
stitutes appropriately masculine behavior. “Fighting to answer an af-
front is part of the masculine ideal for southerners in a way it is not 
for midwesterners,” but this difference “was not due simply to mid-
westerners’ being more nonviolent generally. When questions were 
asked about men who fight when there has been no affront, midwes-
terners and southerners gave the same assessment of the men” as fit-
ting “poorly” with their “definition of manhood.”
193
  
Dov Cohen, Richard Nisbett, Brian Bowdle, and Norbert 
Schwartz expanded on these studies in a series of ingenious “ethno-
graphic experiments.”
194
 Participants were selected for having grown 
up in either the North or South. All participants had to pass a (large, 
6′ 3″, 250 lbs) confederate of the researchers in a narrow hallway 
where there was only room for one person to walk comfortably. The 
new confederate walked down the center of the hall on a collision 
                                                                                                                           
 192 Id at 32.  
 193 Nisbett and Cohen, Culture of Honor at 31 (cited in note 187). 
 194 See generally Dov Cohen, et al, Insult, Aggression, and the Southern Culture of Honor: 
An “Experimental Ethnography,” 70 J Personality & Soc Psych 945, 945 (1996). 
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course with the participant and did not move (except at the last 
second to avoid bumping into the participants).
195 
Members of one group, after making their way past this single 
confederate, were exposed to a battery of tests, including tests for cor-
tisol and testosterone levels, and were asked to self-assess their mascu-
linity. Members of the other group were exposed to the same stimuli 
with one addition: prior to passing the large confederate in the hall-
way, they were insulted by a different confederate who bumped into 
each participant and called him an “asshole.”
196
 While the differences 
between Northern and Southern groups who were not bumped were 
insignificant, the differences between regional groups who were 
bumped were remarkable.  
As the researchers described their findings (and as displayed in 
Figures 4–7 below), compared to Northerners, insulted Southerners 
were “more likely to think their masculine reputation was threat-
ened,” “more upset (as shown by . . . cortisol levels),” “more physiolog-
ically primed for aggression (as shown by . . . testosterone levels),” 
“more cognitively primed for aggression,” and “more likely to engage 
in aggressive and dominant behavior” (as indicated by their unwil-
lingness to back down when encountering the second confederate).
197
  
                                                                                                                           
 195 Id at 948, 950, 953. 
 196 Id at 948. 
 197 Id at 945. 
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FIGURES 4 AND 5.  CHANGES IN CORTISOL AND TESTOSTERONE 
LEVELS FOR INSULTED AND NON-INSULTED SOUTHERNERS AND 
NORTHERNERS.
198
 
 
FIGURES 6 AND 7.  DIFFERENCES IN WILLINGNESS TO BACK DOWN 
AND SELF-PERCEPTIONS OF MASCULINITY.
199 
  
 
The researchers conclude that Southern culture supplies a social 
meaning to physical aggression and status that is distinct from that 
                                                                                                                           
 198 Cohen, et al, 70 J Personality & Soc Psych at 952 (cited in note 194) (depicting figures 
1 and 2).  
 199 Id at 954, 956 (depicting figures 4 and 6). 
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supplied by Northern culture. Southerners are more likely to view in-
sults as diminishing a man’s status, and Southern males are more likely 
to attempt to restore lost status through aggressive or violent beha-
vior.
200
  
Clearly, our argument here is not against biology or natural selec-
tion for cognitive mechanisms that underwrite intuitions about the 
wrongfulness of violent acts of aggression. Individuals, on this account, 
do have rapid, intuitive, emotional responses fed by cognitive and bio-
logical mechanisms that have emerged over the course of human evo-
lution; but those responses, while partially driven by physiological and 
biochemical responses,
201
 are dependent on the social meaning of the 
acts that precede them rather than a discrete moral module within the 
brain. Social norms, as these researchers describe, shape what individ-
uals view as untoward behavior and what individuals consider appro-
priate responses to that behavior.  
c) Disagreements over which acts meet a given standard.  The ex-
amples above illustrate divergent standards governing behavior and 
appropriate responses to perceived wrongs, and one can easily im-
agine those evaluating the acts describing their disagreements in terms 
of explicit value differences and self-consciously norm-inflected mo-
rality. But as we mentioned above, cultural cognition will often pro-
duce subtler forms of dissensus that reflect the implicit influence of 
our diverse cultural commitments in the face of a single standard. 
Thus, even when individuals agree on a legal or moral standard to be 
employed, they may disagree vehemently over whether those stan-
dards have been met. That is, they may disagree about the facts as 
much as—or more than—they disagree about the law. 
By way of illustration, we describe two examples from a series of 
large-scale experiments that we conducted and that are reported in 
greater detail elsewhere.
202
 In each, we asked members of the public to 
serve as mock jurors on a case, and in each case participants were 
asked to make factual findings and determine guilt.  
                                                                                                                           
 200 Id at 956–57. There are evolutionary explanations that we do not evaluate here. See, for ex-
ample, Todd K. Shackelford, An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective on Cultures of Honor, 3 Evol 
Psych 381, 389 (2005) (arguing that these results can be explained via evolutionary psychology).  
 201 Pain often generates responses that are similar to those stemming from a perceived 
social threat, even when the pain is internal to, and completely independent of, the social cir-
cumstances. See Raymond W. Novaco, Anger, in Alan E. Kazdin, ed, 1 Encyclopedia of Psycholo-
gy 170, 171 (Oxford 2000). 
 202 See Kahan and Braman, 45 Am Crim L Rev at 21–49 (cited in note 34) (detailing “neu-
tral umpire,” “political partisanship,” and “self-defensive cognition” models of evaluating self-
defense evidence).  
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The first, modeled on the facts of the Bernard Goetz case,
203
 fea-
tured a slight white man who shot a larger black youth after the youth 
demanded, “Give me five dollars.” The defendant had been mugged 
twice before and claimed that this time, based on past experience, he 
knew that his victim was about to seriously hurt him. He also claimed, 
and an expert witness avowed, that as a result of his prior muggings he 
suffered from posttraumatic stress syndrome. Participants were asked 
to read the following summary of the facts before making any factual 
findings or rendering a verdict: 
George is charged with murdering Alvin. 
George (a 48-year-old white male; 5′ 7″, 142 lbs.) fatally shot Al-
vin (a 17-year-old African American male; 6′ 2″, 215 lbs.) after 
Alvin stated “give me some money, man.” The shooting occurred 
on a city subway platform at 5:30 p.m. on a weekday evening. Af-
ter shooting Alvin, George fled but turned himself in to police 
three hours later. 
George had been mugged on three previous occasions. On one of 
these, he had been beaten and required fifteen stitches under his 
eye. George had reported the robberies, each of which had been 
committed by persons George described as “teen aged, African 
American males,” but police failed to make any arrests. George 
bought the handgun used in the shooting after the third mugging. 
Testifying in his own defense, George told the jury that, although 
he’d never seen Alvin before, George “could tell from his body 
language and the aggressive tone of his voice” that Alvin was 
“going to mess with me.” “It was exactly like the other time I had 
been attacked,” George stated. “I felt I had no choice but to 
shoot him,” George said, “because I knew if I didn’t he was going 
to hurt me real bad.” Alvin had a pocket knife on his person, but 
had not displayed it before being shot. 
The defense also called an expert witness: Dr. Leonard Wallace, a 
Ph.D. psychiatrist on the faculty of a major university. Based on a 
[thorough] psychiatric examination of George, Wallace offered his 
opinion that George was suffering from “post-traumatic stress 
syndrome.” “Like many victims of repeated violent beatings,” Wal-
lace testified, “George lived in constant fear of additional attacks.” 
“In my opinion, George honestly perceived that Alvin would at-
tack him if he didn’t kill him first; that belief was quite reasonable, 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See People v Goetz, 68 NY2d 96 (1986). See also George P. Fletcher, A Crime of Self 
Defense: Bernard Goetz and the Law on Trial 1–2, 198 (Free Press 1988). 
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given the muggings George had previously suffered, and the effect 
of those muggings on his psyche,” Wallace concluded.
204 
The second, based on the trial of Judy Norman,
205 featured a wife who, 
after years of severe physical abuse, shot her husband in his sleep. She 
too claimed that, based on past experience, she sensed that her hus-
band would seriously hurt or kill her when he awoke. She also 
claimed, and an expert witness avowed, that as a result of her prior 
abuse she suffered from battered-spouse syndrome. Participants were 
asked to read the following summary of the facts before making any 
factual findings or rendering a verdict:  
Julie is charged with murdering her husband, William, whom she 
shot in the head as he slept. 
William had persistently abused Julie during their ten-year mar-
riage. This mistreatment included physical beatings, some of 
which resulted in injuries (facial cuts; broken ribs; twice a broken 
nose) requiring emergency medical treatment. Three times the 
police arrested William for assaulting Julie, but released him from 
custody each time after Julie declined to press charges. 
Testifying in her own defense, Julie told the jury that William had 
beaten her on the morning of the shooting after returning home 
from a night of hard drinking and then fallen asleep in the bed-
room. Julie testified that she then went to her mother’s nearby 
home and obtained the hand gun used in the shooting. “I felt I 
had no choice except to shoot him,” she stated, “because I knew 
when he woke up this time he was going to hurt me really bad.” 
The defense also called an expert witness: Dr. Leonard Wallace, a 
Ph.D. psychiatrist on the faculty of a major university. Based on a 
thorough psychiatric examination of Julie, Wallace offered his 
opinion that Julie was suffering from “battered woman syn-
drome.” “Like other victims of chronic domestic violence,” Wal-
lace testified, “Julie believed that she was powerless to leave and 
that no one could or would help her.” “In my opinion, Julie ho-
nestly perceived that her husband would attack her if she didn’t 
kill him first; that belief was quite reasonable, given the beatings 
                                                                                                                           
 204 See Kahan and Braman, 45 Am Crim L Rev at 26, 65 (cited in note 34). 
 205 See State v Norman, 378 SE2d 8, 13 (NC 1989) (affirming the conviction of Judy Norman 
for voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence that she “reasonably believed that 
she was confronted by a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm”). 
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she had previously suffered, and the effect of those beatings on 
her psyche,” he concluded.
206 
The stimuli to which participants were exposed, it should be noted, are 
distinct in several ways from the stimuli in ranking studies described 
in Parts I and II. The factual summaries read by respondents in our 
studies were far more detailed. Participants who read these more de-
tailed scenarios were also provided with jury instructions summarizing 
the doctrinal standard and specifying the relevant facts they needed to 
find in order to convict or acquit. Participants were then asked to an-
swer a series of questions regarding legally relevant facts and, once 
they made those findings, to render a verdict.  
Thus, whereas participants in ranking studies are asked whether 
they think an act described in highly simplified terms is wrong, partic-
ipants in our studies were given highly detailed fact patterns and a 
specific standard under which to evaluate the wrongfulness of the act 
in question. Given the naturalist assertion that the “potential for ex-
aggerating the extent of disagreement becomes greater as the crime 
descriptions become more skeletal, and is at its worst when research-
ers use crime labels rather than factual descriptions,”
207 we would ex-
pect, on the naturalist account, to find far less disagreement here than 
in the ranking studies.  
How did the participants react to these stimuli? To begin with, 
there was significant variation across several dimensions. Blacks were 
more likely to convict George than they were to convict Julie, while 
whites were more likely to convict Julie than George. Similar patterns 
emerged for women and men, Democrats and Republicans, liberals 
and conservatives, and egalitarians and hierarchs, communitarians and 
individualists. In each case, the former were more likely than the latter 
to see George as more deserving of punishment than Julie. The results 
are provided in Table 7 below. 
                                                                                                                           
 206 Kahan and Braman, 45 Am Crim L Rev at 26, 79 (cited in note 34).  
 207 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1860 (cited in note 13). 
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TABLE 7.  FREQUENCY OF GUILTY VERDICTS ACROSS RACE, 
GENDER, PARTY, IDEOLOGY, AND CULTURAL ORIENTATION 
 George Julie 
N = 772 838 
black : white 56% : 29% 41% : 48% 
male : female 34% : 32% 50% : 44% 
Republican : Democrat 24% : 39% 51% : 43% 
liberal : conservative 43% : 23% 42% : 56% 
egalitarian : hierarch 44% : 23% 42% : 51% 
individualist : communitarian 26% : 40% 51% : 43% 
 
These cross-tabulations begin to suggest what the differences 
across the population are like. Every demographic group listed above 
showed significant differences (at p ≤ 0.10) in determinations of guilt 
with one exception: men and women did not significantly differ over 
George’s case.
208
 These findings, of course, stand in stark contrast to the 
ranking studies described above,
209
 which found no differences in rela-
tive seriousness.  
But this kind of simple comparison is far from an ideal evaluation 
of differences of opinion across the population. People are not generi-
cally black or white, male or female, Republican or Democrat, liberal 
or conservative, egalitarian or individualist; these characteristics and 
values tend to come in packages. How would more fleshed-out types 
of people react to each of the cases?  
Imagine two Americans.
210
 Ron, a white male who lives in Arizo-
na, overcame his modest upbringing to become a self-made millio-
naire businessperson. He deeply resents government interference with 
markets but is otherwise highly respectful of authority, which he be-
lieves should be clearly delineated in all spheres of life. Politically, he 
identifies himself as a conservative Republican. Linda is an African 
American woman employed as a social worker in Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania. She is a staunch Democrat and unembarrassed to be charac-
terized as a “liberal.” 
                                                                                                                           
 208 Kahan and Braman, 45 Am Crim L Rev at 34 table 1 (cited in note 34). 
 209 See Part I.A. 
 210 Yes, these are the same folks made famous in a recent and brilliant article assessing the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v Harris, 550 US 372, 386 (2007) (finding that a law enforce-
ment officer acted reasonably in terminating a car chase by taking an action that caused substan-
tial injuries to the driver). See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, and Donald Braman, Whose 
Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 Harv 
L Rev 837, 895–99 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s reasoning failed to connect percep-
tions of societal risk and contested visions of the ideal society, and invested the law with cultural-
ly partisan overtones that detract from the law’s legitimacy).  
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Zelig, a statistical application designed by Kosuke Imai, Gary King, 
and Olivia Lau,
211
 facilitates simulating such complex profiles, furnishing 
a perfect fit for comparing responses across more detailed types of 
people. It allows for reasonable statistical predictions of the perceptions 
of fairly specific types of people by setting pertinent characteristics—
cultural values, gender, race, region of residence, political ideology, and 
party affiliation—to appropriate values in Zelig simulations.  
Individually and collectively, these analyses present a test for the 
naturalist and realist perspectives. If, as naturalists assert, humans eva-
luate cases involving human aggression with high degrees of consis-
tency, then we would expect similar assessments of the wrongfulness 
of each act across the population. Recall that naturalists hold that 
while individuals may disagree about how much to punish bad acts, 
they agree on what constitutes a bad act. As such, on the whole, the 
population should agree that, in each case, the defendant is either 
guilty or innocent. On the other hand, if the realist position is right, 
then the social meaning of the acts will move them to evaluate the 
cases differently, either increasing or decreasing the likelihood of con-
viction or acquittal.  
Relatedly, on the naturalist account, the cases should be viewed as 
consistently more or less bad relative to each other. That is, the perceived 
wrongfulness of acts might not be absolute across the population, but it 
should be consistently ranked across the population. On the realist ac-
count, by contrast, the contingency of the social meaning of the acts 
should cause egalitarians and communitarians like Linda to view 
George’s shooting of strangers (with racial overtones) as worse than the 
act of Julie, the battered woman shooting her husband; and it should 
cause those who favor individualism and traditional social hierarchies 
to view Julie’s shooting of her husband as worse than George’s shoot-
ing, which they would view as a legitimate act of self-defense.   
                                                                                                                           
 211 See Kosuke Imai, Gary King and Olivia Lau, Toward a Common Framework for Statis-
tical Analysis and Development, 17 J Computational & Graph Stats 892, 894 (2008).. In conven-
tional regression analysis, the influence of some set of explanatory variables on a dependent 
variable is expressed in a mathematical equation, the elements of which (regression coefficients, 
standard errors, p-values, and so forth) are reported in a table. Zelig is intended to generate data 
analyses that simultaneously extract more information and present it more intelligibly. Using 
Zelig, an analyst specifies values for the independent variables that form a regression model. The 
application then generates a predicted value for the dependent variable through a statistical 
simulation that takes account of the model’s key parameters (including the standard errors for 
the regression coefficients). It then repeats that process. Then it repeats it again. Then it repeats 
it again and again and again—as many times as directed by the analyst (typically ten thousand 
times, or enough to give a reasonable approximation of the probability distribution for the de-
pendent variable). The resulting array of values for that dependent variable can then be analyzed 
with techniques that are statistically equivalent to those used in survey sampling to determine an 
average predicted value, plus a precisely calculated margin of error. See id at 895–96. 
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So how would these two distinct members of the American venire 
evaluate these cases? As indicated in Figures 8 and 9 below, Zelig re-
veals the kind of demographic and values-based variation that natu-
ralism theorists suggest does not exist.  
FIGURES 8 AND 9.  RON AND LINDA’S WILLINGNESS TO CONVICT 
OR ACQUIT
212
 
 
 
Notice that it is not the case, as naturalists argue, that disagreement is 
generally about the “endpoints” of punishment. What we see here are 
different rates of conviction and acquittal. Moreover, and even more 
strikingly, we see that people with a cultural profile like Ron are in-
clined to acquit George but convict Julie, whereas those with cultural 
profiles like Linda are inclined to do just the reverse.  
                                                                                                                           
 212 With 95 percent confidence intervals. [Should this be a full sentence?] 
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FIGURE 10.  RESULTS OF TAKING FIRST DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
GEORGE AND JULIE’S LIKELIHOOD OF 
CONVICTION AND ACQUITTAL
213
 
 
Because it assumes a lack of diversity in the core of wrongdoing, 
naturalism cannot account for the variation we see in the data. If indi-
viduals have an intuitive sense of the relative wrongfulness of acts, 
then we would expect people with cultural profiles like Ron and Lin-
da to agree—perhaps not on precisely how much punishment a person 
deserves, but at the very least on the relative culpability of the two 
defendants. For naturalism, dissensus in the core of wrongdoing re-
mains a puzzle. 
IV.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
What should those who care about these issues take away from 
all of this? Does either theory provide useful guidance with respect to 
the practical questions that those involved in live debates over crimi-
nal law face?   
A. (Anti-)Punishment Naturalism?  
To begin with, it is hard to see how legal actors can draw any 
normative conclusion from the naturalist literature. We have pointed 
out how evidence amassed by social scientists in various disciplines 
furnishes ample reason to doubt that universally shared “core intui-
tions of justice” dispel dissensus, across space and time, about the sorts 
                                                                                                                           
 213 With 95 percent confidence intervals. [Should this be a full sentence or are we good?] 
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of conduct that should be forbidden and punished. But however one 
characterizes the extent or importance of innate apprehensions of 
wrongfulness, the issue of the moral significance of such sensibilities is 
an entirely different matter. Since at least Hume, it has been well 
known that facts—about anything—do not entail moral “oughts.”
214
 
Accordingly, showing that intuitions of justice are shared does not 
mean they have to be respected.  
The Punishment Naturalists, consistent with their characteristic 
care and thoughtfulness, of course never suggest otherwise. Their in-
junction that lawmakers and advocates of reform respect laws consis-
tent with “shared intuitions” reflects a judgment about the enormous 
effort that would be required to talk humans out of predispositions that 
reflect “600 million years”
215
 of biological programming. “Evidence sug-
gests that it takes a dramatic, concerted effort to alter fundamentally a 
person’s intuitive notions of justice. Such changes in core judgments 
have been notably observed in cases of coerced indoctrination, often 
referred to as ‘brainwashing.’”
216
 This understanding of the intractability 
of core judgments of punishment transforms into a conservative admo-
nition to be wary of even trying, but only after Punishment Naturalists 
take stock of the potentially disastrous consequences of failed attempts 
to do so. “The criminal law can most effectively maximize its moral cre-
dibility and thereby minimize resistance and subversion by adopting 
criminal rules that track shared community intuitions of justice,” Paul 
Robinson and John Darley observe.
217
 “The danger of failing to harmon-
ize criminal codes with intuitions of justice is that the code may lose 
credibility on a wide array of prohibitions if too many are perceived to 
be against notions of what is just.”
218
 Surely, no one would be in favor of 
any reform program that can depend for its success only on the sorts of 
mental reprogramming strategies used by the “Chinese military on 
American soldiers captured during the Korean War”
219
 and that would 
likely, in any case, culminate in “a generalized contempt for the system 
in all its aspects, and a generalized suspicion of all of its rules” and ulti-
mately in the emergence of “active forces of subversion and resistance” 
within the general population.
220
  
                                                                                                                           
 214 See David Hume, 3 A Treatise of Human Nature 455 (Clarendon 1896) (L.A. Selby-
Bigge, ed) (originally published 1739–1740). 
 215 Jones, 87 Cal L Rev at 855 (cited in note 168).  
 216 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 51 (cited in note 15). 
 217 Id at 28. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id at 54. 
 220 Robinson and Darley 81 S Cal L Rev at 24 (cited in note 15). 
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But are these admittedly terrifying prospects really the likely 
outcome of efforts to use law to try to change norms on, say, “date 
rape,” “drunk driving,” “drug use,” or “same-sex intercourse and . . . 
same-sex unions”
221
—examples that the Punishment Naturalists cite as 
involving “criminal law manipulation” by “social engineers”?
222
 Where 
is the empirical evidence of that? Indeed, where is the empirical evi-
dence that even the much more wide-ranging reform effort that Pu-
nishment Naturalists oppose—one evincing uniform hostility to popu-
lar retributivist sensibilities generally and their replacement nonjudg-
mental utilitarian schemes of treatment and control—would result in 
widespread social tumult?  
Perhaps the most obvious clue that the conservative posture asso-
ciated with Punishment Naturalism does not follow in any straightfor-
ward or obvious way from the evidence of the origins of punitive sensi-
bilities on which it is based can be found in the work of another group 
of highly accomplished scholars who draw exactly the opposite conclu-
sions from that same evidence. We call these scholars, who include Jo-
shua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, the Antipunishment Naturalists.  
In work that Punishment Naturalists actually cite for support,
223
 
Greene and Cohen (in work to which Darley also contributed) present 
evidence of the biological origins of widespread moral sensibilities. The 
evidence includes fMRI studies that show that “deontological” moral 
judgments, of which retributive intuitions are a conspicuous component, 
originate in parts of the brain that are associated with fast-acting, un-
conscious, and automatic affective processes. Accordingly, they are 
much more likely to influence action than are “consequentialist” or uti-
litarian moral judgments, which these same studies show originate in a 
more slow-acting, reflective part of the brain, whose thought processes 
can override those of the faster-acting, reactive part only with the exer-
tion of considerable, time-consuming effort.
224
  
Like the Punishment Naturalists, Greene and Cohen identify an 
evolutionary or genetic origin for retributive and like judgments, which 
                                                                                                                           
 221 Id at 52–53. 
 222 Id at 52. 
 223 See id at 58 (citing “Joshua Greene’s neuroscience studies” as support for the observa-
tion that the “core of wrongdoing seems to start with direct personal action”). But see Jonathan 
McGuire, et al, A Reanalysis of the Personal/Impersonal Distinction in Moral Psychology Re-
search, 45 J Exp Soc Psych 577 (2009) (showing that reanalysis of Greene’s data does not support 
a “direct/personal” distinction); Joshua D. Greene, Dual-Process Morality and the Person-
al/Impersonal Distinction: A Reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie, 45 J Exp Soc 
Psych 581 (2009) (acknowledging flaws in the Greene study but noting that additional studies 
support a more fundamental “dual process” neural theory of moral reasoning). 
 224 See generally Joshua D. Greene, et al, The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Con-
trol in Moral Judgment, 44 Neuron 389 (2004); Joshua D. Greene, et al, An fMRI Investigation of 
Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 Sci 2105 (2001). 
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they claim were well adapted to social conditions distinctive of the sorts 
of ties and transactions that were characteristic of our remote tribal 
past.
225
 They agree too that it is difficult, if not impossible, to “educate” 
or talk people out of the punitive positions that they are impelled to by 
their genetic-neurological hardwiring, in part because integral to the 
same circuitry is a disposition to “confabulate”—that is, to seize on post 
hoc rationalizations that occur to us after our unconscious affective sen-
sibilities have committed us to a moral position and that stubbornly 
resist the battering of conscious, reasoned examination.
226
  
But from this foundation—as close as it is to that of the Punish-
ment Naturalists in various critical particulars—the Antipunishment 
Naturalists derive a very different set of normative conclusions. For 
them, the evolutionary origins of our widespread punitive intuitions, 
far from enhancing the moral authority of retributive and like sensi-
bilities, strips them of any pretense of being moral at all: “as an evolu-
tionary matter of fact, we have a taste for retribution, not because 
wrongdoers truly deserve to be punished regardless of the costs and 
benefits, but because retributive dispositions are”—or at least were at 
one point—“an efficient way of inducing behavior that allows individ-
uals living in social groups to more effectively spread their genes.”
227
 
For Greene and Cohen, the truly moral judgments are the ones that 
can be defended on the basis of (nonconfabulatory) reflection on 
what conduces to the best state of affairs in our current situation.  
Of course, if, as the Punishment Naturalists warn, it were futile or 
even self-defeating to oppose retributive sensibilities (however out-
moded and insusceptible of reasoned defense they are), it would also 
be foolish to try to supplant them with intuitions that reflect a conse-
quentialist orientation. But the Antipunishment Naturalists have a 
different account of how such a reform program would fare. As they 
see it, the discoveries of sociobiology and neuroscience on which they 
and the Punishment Naturalists both rely will themselves transform 
our culture:  
The net effect of this influx of scientific information will be a re-
jection of free will as it is ordinarily conceived, with important 
ramifications for the law. As noted above, our criminal justice 
system is largely retributivist. . . . [R]etributivism . . . ultimately 
                                                                                                                           
 225 See Greene and Cohen, 359 Phil Transactions Royal Socy B: Bio Sci at 1782 (cited in 
note 21); Joshua Greene, From Neural “Is” to Moral “Ought”: What Are the Moral Implications 
of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?, 4 Nature Reviews Neurosci 847, 848–49 (2003). 
 226 See, for example, Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, in Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, ed, 3 Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, 
and Development 35, 60–63 (MIT 2008).  
 227 Id at 71. 
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depends on an intuitive, libertarian notion of free will that is un-
dermined by science. Therefore, with the rejection of common-
sense conceptions of free will comes the rejection of retributiv-
ism and an ensuing shift towards a consequentialist approach to 
punishment, i.e. one aimed at promoting future welfare rather 
than meting out just deserts.
228 
The Antipunishment Naturalists offer no empirical evidence (as op-
posed to conjectural storytelling) to back up this account of how a 
program to abolish a retributive system of criminal law will be re-
ceived. But that just means that they present no less empirical evi-
dence than do the Punishment Naturalists in support of their grim 
account of the consequences that meaningful pursuit of that vision 
would entail.  
If one conclusion can confidently be drawn from this disagree-
ment, then, it is that none of the materials on which both the punish-
ment and the Antipunishment Naturalists rely has any obvious moral 
upshot. The privilege of thinking about what to do, and the empirical 
work necessary to determine whether and how it can be done, survive 
naturalism of any variety. 
B. Relevant to What? 
We take it, though, that Punishment Naturalists believe that the 
evidence they furnish is of significant practical import to debates over 
the criminal law. On their account, the most serious problem posed by 
our intuitions about wrongdoing is the attempted imposition of social 
norms that are at odds with human nature. As Robinson and Darley 
recently argued:  
[T]hese findings regarding the nature of intuitions of justice have 
serious implications for a variety of criminal justice debates that 
focus on substantial alterations of criminal justice systems, includ-
ing the abolition of punishment, the distribution of punishment ac-
cording to principles that conflict with shared intuitions of justice, 
and programs to change people’s intuitions about what constitutes 
serious wrongdoing and about how much it should be punished.
229 
Marc Hauser is similarly worried about “policy wonks and politicians” 
who attempt to develop laws that are out of step with our natural in-
tuitions.
230
 This might be generalized to something along the following 
                                                                                                                           
 228 Greene and Cohen, 359 Phil Transactions Royal Socy B: Bio Sci at 1776 (cited in note 21). 
 229 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 11 (cited in note 15).  
 230 Hauser, Moral Minds at xx (cited in note 26).  
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lines: the state should pay close attention to widely shared intuitions 
about justice; it may like them or not, but it ignores them at its peril.  
Do realists object to that? No. But to the realist it is puzzling ad-
vice, for it does not address any live policy debate. What political can-
didate is running on a platform of “Abolish Punishment Now!”? What 
legislator is attempting to implement a program punishing crimes that 
most people think are very serious less harshly than those that most 
people think are not very serious? Even if we were to accept the natu-
ralist account of moral intuition, the added value of assuming that our 
intuitions about punishment are natural rather than social seems neg-
ligible; it just does not address the practical problems that we face re-
lated to punishment. 
But Punishment Naturalists do offer advice to people involved in 
contemporary debates over the criminal law. And, from criminal 
reform efforts on everything from date rape to drug use, the advice 
that they have to offer is pretty discouraging. On their account, issues 
that fall within the core of wrongdoing—and recall that, on their ac-
count, this comprises the vast majority of criminal acts—there will be 
little chance of making a lasting impact. As Robinson and Darley put 
it: “Because of the universal and intuitional nature of core judgments 
about justice . . . these judgments cannot easily be changed.”
231
 And, for 
those few wrongful acts that remain outside of the core, they offer 
advice for those interested in reform. The activity in question has to be 
plausibly viewed as intentionally inflicting harm on others in ways that 
can be viewed as similar to some wrong within the “core” of wrong-
doing, and the most effective mode of argument is to analogize to that 
core wrong.
232
 
What could possibly be wrong with this advice? In fact, picking 
reasonable targets for reform and then hammering home the message 
that the targeted activity is similar to other stigmatized and punished 
acts certainly seems like common sense.  
But is it? The advice on offer strikes us as simply inapposite. Indi-
viduals disagree about whether a car salesman who successfully con-
vinces his target to buy a lemon has committed fraud—at the core of 
deception in exchange—or has simply displayed admirable American 
                                                                                                                           
 231 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 53 (cited in note 15). To drive home the point of 
how difficult any reform efforts (even those outside of the core of wrongdoing) will be, they 
describe the failures of various indoctrination campaigns, including the immense effort required 
for, and relatively short-term effects of, the brainwashing of POWs during the Korean war, the 
impossibly strained conditions that produce Stockholm Syndrome, and the failure of Prohibition 
to reform intuitions about alcohol consumption—and these involved efforts aimed at offenses 
outside of the “core”! 
 232 See Kerr, The Intuition of Retribution (cited in note 23).  
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salesmanship.
233
 The question is not whether it is analogous to fraud; 
the question is whether it is fraud.  
If fraud strikes you as not quite “core” enough, imagine, for exam-
ple, that you were concerned with reducing acquaintance rape, includ-
ing the imposition of unwanted sex on women whose verbal resistance 
is ignored. The idea that such behavior is “analogous” to—or just is—
rape has been exactly what reformers have been arguing, and their op-
ponents resisting, for decades. The argument is not about what is ana-
logous to the core; it is about what the core is. No position that abstracts 
away from the cultural dispute over the definition of rape can possibly 
generate advice to reformers about what they should do.
234
  
Or imagine that you were concerned with reducing violence 
against women. You see that women who are victims of homicide are 
often killed by husbands or boyfriends who discover or suspect infi-
delity. The law, you come to believe, encourages this behavior by al-
lowing those who kill an unfaithful partner to be convicted not of 
murder, but of the lesser crime of manslaughter. Infidelity, the law tells 
the public, is “adequate provocation” for such mitigation. Judges, 
moreover, say that the law reflects a perfectly natural sentiment.
235
 The 
advice to “argue from analogy” to agreed-upon “core” offenses is un-
helpful because it simply ignores that the core is itself a site of intense 
cultural dispute: there is a serious dispute about whether the act is—or 
is not—murder.  
Similarly, people of varying cultural outlooks disagree about 
whether a woman who kills her chronically abusive husband has 
committed a core crime—murder—or no crime at all, not about how 
to deal with some peripheral offense “analogous to” murder. And the 
list goes on.
236
  
C. Some Realist Advice 
Realists, like naturalists, are circumspect about the prospects for 
resolving many disputes over the law, though for different reasons and 
                                                                                                                           
 233 Analogously, individuals disagree about whether and when omitting information in an 
exchange is a form of lying or no wrong at all. See Richard Craswell, Taking Information Serious-
ly: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 Va L Rev 565, 574–75 
(2006). 
 234 See Kahan, 158 U Pa L Rev at 805 (cited in note 158). 
 235 One judge, famously quoted by Cynthia Lee in her book, Murder and the Reasonable 
Man, lamented his duty to impose any sentence at all on a man who shot and killed his wife after 
discovering her infidelity, saying “I seriously wonder how many men [on discovering spousal 
infidelity] would have the strength to walk away without inflicting some corporal punishment.” 
Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man 41 (NYU 2003).  
 236 See Kahan, 158 U Pa L Rev at 805 (cited in note 158) (discussing the problem of disa-
greement over the core offense in the acquaintance rape context). 
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with different consequences. Realist circumspection derives not from 
the view that reform within the core pits impotent cultural forces 
against powerful innate intuitions, but rather from the view that 
reform of most of the salient legal standards pits powerful cultural 
forces against one another. The realist reasons that many debates over 
the law are so fraught because they are about whose values the law 
will privilege. This can lead to fierce social conflict with the status of 
the law marking which social group has prevailed.
237
  
But even if the structure of some cultural conflicts requires the law 
to choose a winner, in at least some other instances, diverse citizens are 
willing to focus on shared concerns. Talk about deterrence, utility, and 
social welfare often signals that parties are attempting to resolve their 
disputes without resorting to culturally sectarian forms of argument.
238
 
This is, in essence, the basis of liberal democratic deliberation.  
But even those committed to a liberal ideal of deliberation over 
the law can polarize on issues along cultural lines. A growing literature 
suggests that this can be explained by the phenomenon of cultural 
cognition, which causes individuals to conform their factual beliefs to 
their cultural priors, preventing them from reaching agreement de-
spite their commitment to social welfare maximization or some other 
nonsectarian ground for deliberation.239  
Here, we think, a little realism may be of assistance. Where par-
ties have agreed to resolve a dispute on nonsectarian terms, but are 
hampered by cultural biases that cause them to come to conflicting 
conceptions of the facts, it may be possible to help parties attend to 
factual data in a less biased manner. While research in this area is on-
going, understanding the nature of the conflict as cultural is crucial to 
developing effective strategies for mitigating polarization of factual 
beliefs along cultural lines.  
D. Doing What Comes Naturally 
Ironically, although Punishment Naturalism is focused on shared 
intuitions about wrongfulness, taking it to heart seems likely to esca-
late social conflict over the criminal law. To understand why, though, 
one has to understand how Punishment Naturalism leverages well-
established psychological phenomena involved in evaluating wrongful 
acts and actors.  
                                                                                                                           
 237 See generally Dan M. Kahan and Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 
24 Yale L & Pol Rev 147 (2006). 
 238 See generally Kahan, 113 Harv L Rev 413 (cited in note 11). 
 239 See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 Stan L Rev 115 (2007).  
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The first phenomenon is naïve realism.
240
 Naïve realism suggests 
that people are quite good at spotting bias in others, but not very good 
at spotting it in themselves. (The realism part of naïve realism refers to 
the ability of individuals to perceive biasing influences on other 
people; the naïve part of naïve realism refers to the belief that such 
biases do not obtain in the self.) As a result of this widely studied me-
chanism, we are likely to view other people as having biased and ab-
normal conceptions of the world—at least relative to ourselves. As a 
result, when it comes to moral disputes, we are likely to view others 
(rather than ourselves) as suffering from some form of moral bias.  
The self-serving nature of naïve realism echoes another pheno-
menon that is one of the most famous in all of social psychology: fun-
damental attribution error.
241
 When attempting to attribute our own 
acts to either some fundamental attribute or situational influence, we 
tend to view our socially desirable acts as stemming from fundamental 
attributes and undesirable acts as stemming from situational influ-
ences. When evaluating the acts of others, though, the reverse is true: 
actors tend to attribute the undesirable acts of others to fundamental 
attributes and desirable acts to situational influences.
242
 Thus, if we 
think of our own moral acts and expressions as desirable, we will tend 
to think of them as reflecting a fundamental moral character rather 
than some contingent or situational valuation; and the same will be 
true for our attributions of the undesirable acts—acts we perceive as 
immoral—of others. In moral disputes, then, we tend to view our dif-
ferent behaviors as reflecting relatively fundamental attributes in both 
ourselves and those with whom we disagree.  
What does this have to do with Punishment Naturalism? Think, 
for a moment, about the way naturalist explanations orient individuals 
with respect to their disagreements with one another. Recall that na-
turalism posits that normally developed humans will share naturally 
occurring intuitions about the vast majority of wrongful acts. And re-
call that because of the phenomenon of naïve realism and fundamen-
tal attribution bias, individuals are more likely to attribute such biases 
to others than to themselves and to think of them as reflecting funda-
mental differences. Then ask yourself this: does thinking that someone 
                                                                                                                           
 240 See Lee Ross and Andrew Ward, Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, 
in Edward S. Reed, Elliot Turiel, and Terrance Brown, eds, Values and Knowledge 103, 110–11 
(Lawrence Erlbaum 1996).  
 241 See generally Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in 
the Attribution Process, in Leonard Berkowitz, ed, 10 Advances in Experimental Social Psycholo-
gy 173 (Academic 1977). 
 242 See generally Bertram F. Malle, The Actor–Observer Asymmetry in Attribution: A (Sur-
prising) Meta-Analysis, 132 Psych Bull 895 (2006). 
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who disagrees with you is innately abnormal in a fundamental moral 
capacity increase or decrease the likelihood of your understanding 
their concerns and working toward viable reform? As it happens, what 
research has been done in this area suggests that it is quite easy to 
think of outgroup members as fundamentally different from oneself, 
and that this decreases the likelihood of cooperation.
243
  
When evaluating one another’s claims, realists caution themselves 
against viewing those with whom they disagree as having an innately 
or fundamentally abnormal moral instinct. This does not by any means 
guarantee that they will be able to come to an agreement or effect 
reform—explicit value differences have underwritten and continue to 
generate serious social conflict. But it does, we hope, help guard 
against the all-too-easy jump to thinking that those who disagree with 
our moral intuitions do so because they suffer from some fundamental 
moral abnormality. Indeed, is this not already a problem in conflict 
around the world: that we come to think of the people with whom we 
disagree as intrinsically less moral rather than contingently different 
along cultural lines?
244
  
Fundamental attribution error and naïve realism can also help us 
understand why it is that Punishment Naturalism, despite all of the 
contrary evidence, feels so natural to so many people. These (perhaps 
even universal!) cognitive mechanisms cause us to favor arguments 
like Punishment Naturalism. And it is these cognitive mechanisms that 
Punishment Naturalists reinforce when they argue that we should “lis-
ten more closely to the moral voice of our species” and avoid the call 
of “policy wonks” who tell us that we should adjust our intuitions to fit 
their reasoned arguments for improving social welfare. Our moral 
intuitions, our cognitive biases persuade us, are both unbiased and 
reflect a fundamentally positive aspect of our nature.  
                                                                                                                           
 243 What research does exist in this area suggests that those who view human nature as 
largely set and inflexible are also more likely to look upon out-group members as less likely to 
be cooperative, and are thus less likely to actually cooperate with them; the inverse is true for 
those who view human nature to be more malleable. See generally, for example, Sheri R. Levy, 
Chi-yue Chiu and Ying-yi Hong, Lay Theories and Intergroup Relations, 9 Group Processes 
Intergroup Rel 5 (2006) (describing how various lay theories about human attributes and cogni-
tion affect intergroup relations); Nick Haslam, et al, Psychological Essentialism, Implicit Theories, 
and Intergroup Relations, 9 Group Processes Intergroup Rel 63 (2006) (finding that the belief 
that human attributes are malleable increases intergroup cooperation); Giulio Boccato, et al, The 
Automaticity of Infra-humanization, 37 Euro J Soc Psych 987 (2007) (finding support for the 
infra-humanization hypothesis that uniquely human emotions are automatically more linked in 
memory with the in-group than with the out-group).  
 244 See Nick Haslam, Dehumanization: An Integrative Review, 10 Personality & Soc Psych 
Rev 252, 252 (2006) (noting the tendency to treat out-group members “as animal-like” and to 
represent them as “objects or automata”).  
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We think Punishment Realism gets it right—that is, it furnishes a 
more accurate depiction of human moral intuitions than Punishment 
Naturalism—and for most people, getting it right will be enough. But 
we also think it can help solve—or at least not exacerbate—collective 
action problems. Realism points citizens in a productive direction, fo-
cusing attention on issues around which there is genuine dispute and 
lack of coordination. It also highlights the social and cognitive me-
chanisms that generate that unnecessary conflict, allowing legal actors 
to develop tools with which to understand the source of dissensus. 
That certainly does not guarantee a quick or easy resolution, but it 
does, we think, provide a reasonable start toward solving the difficult 
problems involved in such disputes.  
CONCLUSION 
We hope that the reader has come to this point with an apprecia-
tion for the way widely shared—perhaps even universal—cognitive 
mechanisms can give rise to diverse and often conflicting intuitions 
about justice. Many of these mechanisms may be the products of natu-
ral selection, but their flexibility lends our intuitions tremendous 
range and scope. Knowledge about our cognitive building blocks, on 
this realist account, can help us understand why our intuitions about 
what is just seem so natural, even when they are so clearly subject to 
cultural variation.  
We have the utmost respect for Punishment Naturalism, which 
we recognize as embodying a rich and growing stock of insights in-
formed by highly rigorous and sophisticated methods. There is a grow-
ing trend toward the integration of empirical insights from a variety of 
disciplines into legal scholarship. The originality of argument and the 
scope of the research that characterize Punishment Naturalism are a 
testament to the value of this trend.  
We do feel deep concern, however, over what we take to be the 
politically conservative resonances with which the Punishment Natu-
ralist has been needlessly infused. It is, simply put, extremely difficult 
to take in the corpus of work that the Punishment Naturalists have 
amassed without sensing a deep commitment on their part to the sta-
tus quo—to popular retributive sensibilities as they are (or are de-
picted with a high degree of uniformity to be), and to laws that con-
form (or are depicted as conforming) to them. Popular understandings 
of wrongfulness, we are repeatedly told, are “deep, predictable, and 
widely shared.”
245
 They are the product of inexorable biological 
                                                                                                                           
 245 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1892 (cited in note 13). 
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forces—“an evolved predisposition” combined with “social learning” 
of the sort that “arise[s] only from . . . human life experience[s] so fun-
damental as to be essentially universal to all persons.”
246 As such, it is 
naïve to expect “arguments or education” to change them;
247
 some-
thing much more fundamental, and much more odious, would be ne-
cessary “to fundamentally alter . . . intuitive notions of justice,” some-
thing akin to the “coercive indoctrination” that is characteristic of to-
talitarian states and that would never “be tolerated in a modern liber-
al democracy.”
248
 Less extreme “social engineering programs aimed at 
changing”
249
 norms through laws are not only likely to fail, but also to 
blow up in the engineers’, and everyone else’s, faces: “when the crimi-
nal justice system is seen as out of tune with community sentiments,” 
the law suffers a “loss of moral credibility” that can grow into “a gene-
ralized contempt for the system in all its aspects, [ ] a generalized sus-
picion of all of its rules,” and ultimately the destruction of its “relev-
ance as a guide to good conduct.”
250
  
It is possible that the Punishment Naturalists mean to direct their 
cautionary, “hands off” admonition only to academic theorists who 
call for replacing “punishment” informed by retributive sensibilities of 
any sort with a humanistic—or perhaps simply technocratic—
utilitarian regime animated by goals of incapacitation and therapy.
251
 
As we have pointed out, the most intriguing theoretical architects of 
such a system build their regime on the same psychobiological foun-
dation on which the Punishment Naturalists rest their own populist 
retributivism.
252
 But the generality with which the Punishment Natural-
ists couch the lessons they draw from their work, and the nature of the 
concrete examples they give of “recent reform programs” that embo-
dy “criminal law manipulation . . . by social engineers”
253
—programs 
aimed at reforming rape law, at reducing smoking, at increasing pu-
nishment of domestic violence, at discouraging recreational drug use, 
at focusing attention on drunk driving, at combating workplace sexual 
harassment, and at “build[ing] public acceptance of both same-sex 
                                                                                                                           
 246 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1646, 1687 (cited in note 14). 
 247 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 52 (cited in note 15). 
 248 Id at 54–55. 
 249 Id at 51. 
 250 Id at 24. 
 251 See, for example, Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1892 (cited in note 13) (“[I]t 
may be unrealistic to expect the population to all ‘rise above’ its desire to punish wrongdoers, or 
to expect the government to ‘reeducate’ people away from their interest in punishing wrong-
doers, as is urged by some reformers.”). See also Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev 
at 1688 (cited in note 14). 
 252 See Part IV.A. 
 253 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 52–53 (cited in note 15). 
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intercourse . . . and same-sex unions”
254
—invite readers (who have in-
deed accepted the invitation
255
) to see their resistance to using law to 
change norms as having much broader normative significance.  
Our goal has been to show that Punishment Naturalism does not 
supply a basis for any particular position on any live and disputed is-
sue in the criminal law informed by clashing cultural values. We con-
clude with a statement of three interrelated propositions that we think 
survive close engagement with Punishment Naturalism and that de-
feat any attempt to derive a generic, conservative suspicion to norm 
reform from it.  
First, as a matter of politically consequential fact, intuitions of jus-
tice are characterized by immense cultural heterogeneity. It might be 
the case that, for the most part, human beings everywhere and at all 
times have been opposed to murder, rape, and misappropriation. But 
over space and over time, what counts as murder, rape, and misappro-
priation have varied tremendously. The reason is that cultural norms 
define key elements of those wrongs—who counts as a person, for 
example, what sorts of behavior interfere with a person’s vital inter-
ests, what kinds of behavior surrender rightful control of one’s body, 
what sorts of personal and communal claims constrain individual en-
titlements to property, and the like. Opposing understandings like 
these persist across identifiable cultural groups in contemporary 
American society. They are what animate debates about rape reform, 
gradations of homicide, abortion, the scope of antifraud provisions, 
and myriad other issues.  
Second, intuitions of justice are plastic. By this we mean that such 
understandings do in fact change in one place over time. Often change 
is slow and gradual; but sometimes it is quite sudden and dramatic.  
Third, intuitions of justice and law are endogenous. This is the 
simple point that understandings of wrongdoing and law are recipro-
cally related: what is considered “wrongful” influences law, and what 
the law prohibits influences understandings of what is wrongful, and 
also how wrongful it is. Accordingly, law reform often can be a catalyst 
for norm change—indeed, for norm change that itself feeds back on 
law and thus back on itself. Examples of such interplay are legion, in-
cluding the prominent example of homicide law in the United States, 
where the changing factual circumstances that the law (formally 
through doctrine, and practically through jury verdicts) recognizes as 
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 255 See Kerr, The Intuition of Retribution (cited in note 23). 
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full or partial defenses show how highly interactive culture, law, and 
intuitions relating to core wrongdoing can be.
256
  
We want to close with an admission and some appreciation. It is 
quite possible that we are wrong. The beauty of the best naturalist 
work—and here we are thinking of the work of those we have criticized 
above—is that it makes clear claims based on readily discernible data. 
We think that the naturalists have missed data and that their claims are 
too broad, but they have moved the ball forward significantly by articu-
lating claims that previously had been made without data and which 
were thus nearly impossible to engage on the merits. And perhaps we 
are too critical. Perhaps we are succumbing to cognitive biases that 
cause us to favor evidence supporting our own parochial perspective. 
Perhaps. Happily, if you think that, you are already a realist.  
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APPENDIX 
Items from the ranking studies conducted by Robinson and 
Kurzban.
257
  
The following four scenarios were typically assigned no punish-
ment and were thus unranked.  
DEFENDING ATTACK. John is knocked down from behind by a man 
with a knife who moves to stab him. As the man lunges for him, John 
stabs him with a piece of glass he finds on the ground, which is the 
only thing he can do to save himself from being killed. The man later 
dies of his injuries.  
COERCIVE THREAT TO CHILD. A man grabs John’s child and puts a 
sharp knife to her throat. He tells John that he will kill the child if 
John does not steal an expensive digital camera from a nearby shop or 
he attempts to contact police. Because the man can see everything he 
does, John does as he is told in order to save his child.  
UMBRELLA MISTAKE. John takes another person’s umbrella assuming 
it to be his own because it is has the same unusual color pattern as his 
own, a fact that the police confirm.  
HALLUCINATION. Another person slips a drug into John’s food, which 
causes him to hallucinate that he is being attacked by a wolf. When John 
strikes out in defense, he does not realize that he is in fact striking a 
person, a fact confirmed by all of the psychiatrists appointed by the 
state, who confirm that John had no ability to prevent the hallucination.  
The following twenty-four were typically ranked as increasingly 
serious offenses and as deserving increasing quanta of punishment.  
WHOLE PIES FROM BUFFET. The owner has posted rules at his all-you-
can-eat buffet that expressly prohibit taking food away; patrons can 
only take what they eat at the buffet. The owner has set the price of 
the buffet accordingly. John purchases dinner at the buffet, but when 
he leaves he takes with him two whole pies to give to a friend.  
LOGO T-SHIRT FROM STORE. John notices in a small family-owned 
music store a T-shirt with the logo of his favorite band. While the store 
clerk is preoccupied with inventory, John places the $15 T-shirt in his 
coat and walks out, with no intention of paying for it.  
                                                                                                                           
 257 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1894–98 (cited in note 13).  
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SHORT CHANGE CHEAT. John is a cab driver who picks up a high 
school student. Because the customer seems confused about the mon-
ey transaction, John decides he can trick her and gives her $20 less 
change than he knows she is owed.  
CLOCK RADIO FROM CAR. As he is walking to a party in a friend’s 
neighborhood, John sees a clock radio on the backseat of a car parked 
on the street. Later that night, on his return from the party, he checks 
the car and finds it unlocked, so he takes the clock radio from the 
back seat.  
ELECTRIC DRILL FROM GARAGE. John does not have all the tools he 
needs for his workshop but knows of a family two streets over who 
sometimes leave unlocked the door to the detached garage next to 
their house. When he next sees his chance, he enters the detached ga-
rage through the unlocked door and takes a medium-sized electric 
drill, intending to keep it forever.  
MICROWAVE FROM HOUSE. While a family is on vacation, John jim-
mies the back door to their house and steps into their kitchen. On the 
counter, he sees their microwave, which he carries away.  
SMASHING TV. While a family is away for the day, John breaks in 
through a bedroom widow and rummages through the house looking 
for valuables. He can only find an eighteen-inch television, which angers 
him. When he gets it outside, he realizes that it is an older model than 
he wants, so he smashes it onto the driveway, breaking it into pieces.  
SLAP AND BRUISING AT RECORD STORE. A record store patron is 
wearing a cap that mocks John’s favorite band. John follows him from 
the store, confronts him, then slaps him in the face hard, causing him 
to stumble. The man’s face develops a harsh black and yellow bruise 
that does not go away for some time.  
HEAD-BUTT AT STADIUM. While attending a football game, John be-
comes angry as he overhears an opposing fan’s disparaging remarks 
about John’s team. At the end of the game, John sticks his face in the 
man’s face and head-butts him, causing a black eye and a gash that 
requires two stitches to close.  
STITCHES AFTER SOCCER GAME. Angry after overhearing another 
parent’s remarks during a soccer match in which John’s son is playing, 
John approaches the man after the game, grabs his coffee mug, knocks 
him down, then kicks him several times while he is on the ground, 
knocking him out for several minutes and causing cuts that require 
five stitches.  
File: 01 Braman, Kahan, and Hoffman Created on: 10/13/2010 11:42:00 AM Last Printed: 10/27/2010 4:42:00 PM 
2010] Some Realism about Punishment Naturalism 1609 
NECKLACE SNATCH AT MALL. As a woman searches her purse for car 
keys in a mall parking lot, John runs up and grabs her gold necklace 
but it does not break. He yanks the woman to the ground by her neck-
lace, where she gashes her head, requiring stitches. John runs off with-
out the necklace.  
ATTEMPTED ROBBERY AT GAS STATION. John demands money from 
a man buying gas at a gas station. When the man refuses, John punches 
the man several times in the face, breaking his jaw and causing several 
cuts that each require stitches. He then runs off without getting any 
money.  
CLUBBING DURING ROBBERY. To force a man to give up his wallet 
during a robbery attempt, John beats the man with a club until he re-
linquishes his wallet, which contains $350. The man must be hospita-
lized for two days.  
MAULING BY PIT BULLS. Two vicious pit bulls that John keeps for illeg-
al dog fighting have just learned to escape and have attacked a person 
who came to John’s house. The police tell John he must destroy the 
dogs, which he agrees to do but does not intend to do. The next day, the 
dogs escape again and maul to death a man delivering a package.  
INFANT DEATH IN CAR. John is driving to see a man about buying an 
illegal gun but must baby-sit his friend’s toddler son. It occurs to him 
that it is too hot to safely leave the toddler in the car but he decides to 
leave him anyway and to return soon. He gets talking with the seller, 
however, and forgets about the toddler, who passes out and dies.  
STABBING. John is offended by a woman’s mocking remark and de-
cides to hurt her badly. At work the next day, when no one else is 
around, he picks up a letter opener from his desk and stabs her. She 
later dies from the wound.  
AMBUSH SHOOTING. John knows the address of a woman who has 
highly offended him. As he had planned the day before, he waits there 
for the woman to return from work and, when she appears, John 
shoots her to death.  
ABDUCTION SHOOTING. A woman at work reveals John’s misdeeds to 
his employer, thereby getting him fired. John devises a plan to get 
even with her. The next week he forces the woman into his car at knife 
point and drives her to a secluded area where he shoots her to death.  
BURNING MOTHER FOR INHERITANCE. John works out a plan to kill 
his sixty-year-old invalid mother for the inheritance. He drags [her] to 
her bed, puts her in, and lights her oxygen mask with a cigarette, hop-
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ing to make it look like an accident. The elderly woman screams as her 
clothes catch fire and she burns to death. John just watches her burn.  
RANSOM, RAPE, TORTURE AND STRANGLING. John kidnaps an eight-
year-old girl for ransom, rapes her, then records the child’s screams as 
he burns her with a cigarette lighter, sending the recording to her par-
ents to induce them to pay his ransom demand. Even though they pay 
as directed, John strangles the child to death to avoid leaving a witness.  
 
 
